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INTRODUCTION 
If the nineteenth century was a world of privacy and prudery, a world of closed 
doors and drawn blinds, both literally and figuratively, then the world of the 
twenty-first century is the world of the one-way mirror, the world of the all-
seeing eye.1 
See EVERYTHING on the network. With a complete historical record, there 
are no more secrets; every action taken on the network is recorded and stored.2 
Imagine your life as a line of events.  Color an event red if a business 
records personal information about it; otherwise, color it blue.3  How “red” is 
your line?  Very.  “[I]t has become increasingly rare to deal with any . . . 
private-sector organization without generating and relying upon a database of 
personal information.”4  The consequence is a loss of informational privacy. 
Informational privacy is a matter of control.  It is “the claim of individuals, 
groups, or institutions to determine for themselves when, how, and to what 
extent information about them is communicated to others.”5  The degree of 
control we once enjoyed has vanished.6  Advances in information-processing 
 
 1. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, GUARDING LIFE’S DARK SECRETS: LEGAL AND SOCIAL 
CONTROLS OVER REPUTATION, PROPRIETY, AND PRIVACY 272 (2007). 
 2. Top 10 Reasons for Complete Network Visibility, SOLERA NETWORKS, http://www.solera 
networks.com/company/resources/top-ten (last visited Jan. 2, 2011).  Deep packet inspection 
technology allows one’s ISP to view virtually all the unencrypted content one sends over the 
Internet.  See Paul Ohm, The Rise and Fall of Invasive ISP Surveillance, 5 U. ILL. L. REV. 1417, 
1437–39 (2009). 
 3. The image is adapted from JAMES B. RULE, PRIVACY IN PERIL 32–33 (2007). 
 4. James B. Rule, Toward Strong Privacy: Values, Markets, Mechanisms, and Institutions, 
54 U. TORONTO L.J. 183, 183 (2004). 
 5. ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (2d prtg. 1967).  See also U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 763 (1989) (“[B]oth the 
common law and the literal understandings of privacy encompass the individual’s control of 
information concerning his or her person.”); RULE, supra note 3, at 3 (defining “privacy as the 
exercise of an authentic option to withhold information on one’s self”); A. Michael Froomkin, 
The Death of Privacy?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1461, 1462 (2000) (“I will use ‘informational privacy’ 
as shorthand for the ability to control the acquisition or release of information about oneself.”). 
 6. The erosion began in the 1950s with the development of credit reporting practices.  See 
RULE, supra note 3, at 99.  For a fuller discussion, compare Priscilla M. Regan, The United 
States, in GLOBAL PRIVACY PROTECTION: THE FIRST GENERATION 50, 55 (James B. Rule & 
Graham Greenleaf eds., 2008) (noting the development of the computer in the 1960s triggered an 
interest in informational privacy).  Richard Posner’s summary is succinct and accurate: 
[U]ntil quite recently the information that people voluntarily disclosed to vendors, 
licensing bureaus, hospitals, public libraries, and so forth, was scattered, fugitive (because 
the bulkiness of paper records usually causes them to be discarded as soon as they lose 
their value to the enterprise), and searchable only with great difficulty.  So although one 
had voluntarily disclosed private information on innumerable occasions to sundry 
recipients, one retained as a practical matter a great deal of privacy.  But with digitization, 
not only can recorded information be retained indefinitely at little cost, but also the 
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technology now give others considerable power to determine when personal 
information is collected, how it is used, and to whom it is distributed.  Privacy 
advocates sound the alarm in regard to both the governmental and private 
sectors.7  I focus entirely on the latter and, within that, exclusively on 
commercial interactions.  Private sector commercial transactions merit separate 
consideration.  Not only do they raise complex and important issues, they also 
have not been as extensively examined as governmental intrusions.8 
Privacy advocates raise a diverse array of concerns: “[T]heorists have 
proclaimed the value of privacy to be protecting intimacy, friendship, dignity, 
individuality, human relationships, autonomy, freedom, self-development, 
creativity, independence, imagination, counterculture, eccentricity, freedom of 
thought, democracy, reputation, and psychological well-being.”9  The diversity 
of concerns reflects the remarkably broad effect of the power others now have 
over one’s personal information.  One important reason the effects are so far 
reaching is that information-processing practices now 
share a distinctive and sociologically crucial quality: they not only collect and 
record details of personal information; they also are organized to provide 
bases for action toward the people concerned.  Systematically harvested 
personal information, in other words, furnishes bases for institutions to 
determine what treatment to mete out to each individual. . . .  Mass 
surveillance is a distinctive and consequential feature of our times.  Whether 
 
information held by different merchants, insurers, and government agencies can readily be 
pooled, opening the way to assembling all the recorded information concerning an 
individual in a single digital file that can easily be retrieved and searched.  It should soon 
be possible—maybe it is already possible—to create comprehensive electronic dossiers 
for all Americans, similar to the sort of dossier the FBI compiles when it conducts 
background investigations of applicants for sensitive government employment or 
investigates criminal suspects.  The difference is that the digitized dossier that I am 
imagining would be continuously updated. 
Richard A. Posner, Privacy, Surveillance, and Law, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 245, 248 (2008). 
 7. Three recent books illustrate the tenor of the literature: JON L. MILLS, PRIVACY: THE 
LOST RIGHT, at xi (2008) (“Intrusion is commonplace.  Every single individual in today’s society 
is at risk.”); RULE, supra note 3, at 200 (warning of the “endless erosion of privacy”); DANIEL J. 
SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY 4 (2008) (“[T]he profound proliferation of new information 
technologies during the twentieth century . . . made privacy erupt into a frontline issue around the 
world.”). 
 8. The last 300 years of political philosophy have emphasized the critical role of privacy in 
limiting the power of the state, and although scholars may disagree about how, and how much, to 
protect privacy, by now we surely all agree that allowing the state to reach too deeply into its 
citizens’ lives puts freedom at risk.  Recent examples include: MILLS, supra note 7; RULE, supra 
note 3; SOLOVE, supra note 7; Froomkin, supra note 5; Jed Rubenfeld, The End Of Privacy, 61 
STAN. L. REV. 101 (2008). 
 9. SOLOVE, supra note 7, at 98.  See also John Collette, Role Demands, Privacy and 
Psychological Well-Being, 30 INT’L J. OF SOC. PSYCHIATRY 222, 223 (1984) (examining the 
negative effects on women from loss of privacy). 
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carried out by government agencies or private-sector organizations, it shapes 
the ways we approach major institutions and our treatment at their hands.10 
I assume that we should impose limits on “mass surveillance”—on what James 
B. Rule defines  as the use of “systematically harvested personal 
information, . . . to determine what treatment to mete out to each individual.”11  
I will not argue for this assumption; I rely instead on the arguments and 
examples offered in the privacy literature.  My question is how we should limit 
mass surveillance. 
Setting limits is no simple task.  Increased information processing power 
yields significant benefits, including increased availability of relevant 
information, increased economic efficiency, and improved security.12  Any 
adequate account of how to set limits must explain how to balance the benefits 
against the loss of information privacy.  Many nonetheless find the solution 
obvious: require consent.13  That is, require businesses to present consumers 
with relevant information (in some specified fashion) and then to secure 
agreement to proceed with the transaction.14  I will call this a “consent 
requirement,” although what is actually required is just the presentation of 
information accompanied by some consumer action interpreted as agreement.15  
 
 10. RULE, supra note 3, at 14. 
 11. Id. 
 12. See Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, 50 STAN. L. REV. 
1193, 1217–18 (1998) (noting that allowing the processing of personal information makes 
commerce more efficient, prevents fraud, promotes transparency, and increases the relevant 
information businesses send consumers while decreasing the irrelevant information).  See also 
Kenneth A. Bamberger & Deirdre K. Mulligan, Privacy Decisionmaking in Administrative 
Agencies, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 75, 86 (2008) (“[P]olicy decisions frequently counterpose privacy 
against two other powerful values: efficiency and security.”).  Paul Ohm contends that privacy 
scholars have overestimated the security benefits of processing personal information.  Ohm, 
supra note 2, at 1466–68. 
 13. See, e.g., RULE, supra note 3, at 196.  Notice and consent (either by opt-in or opt-out) is 
required by the fair information practice principles.  Fair Information Practice Principles, FED. 
TRADE COMM’N, http://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy3/fairinfo.shtm (last updated June 25, 2007) 
[hereinafter FTC].  These principles were recently affirmed at the 31st International Conference 
of Privacy and Data Protection, which culminated in the signing of the Madrid Declaration.  THE 
MADRID DECLARATION (2009), available at http://thepublicvoice.org/TheMadridPrivacyDeclara 
tion.pdf.  Despite their popularity, consent requirements have also sparked considerable criticism.  
See, e.g., Ohm, supra note 2, at 1474–77; Paul M. Schwartz, Internet Privacy and the State, 32 
CONN. L. REV. 815, 822–23 (2000) (noting the criticism but endorsing a limited consent 
requirement). 
 14. See J. Howard Beales, III & Timothy J. Muris, Choice or Consequences: Protecting 
Privacy in Commercial Information, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 109, 112 (2008). 
 15. As Paul Schwartz notes, “when a Web site says something about its data processing 
practices—even if this statement is vague or reveals poor practice—the visitor to the site is 
deemed to be in agreement with these practices so long as she sticks around.  This summary, 
despite its ironic tone, is no exaggeration.”  Schwartz, supra note 13, at 824. 
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A consent requirement not only appears to guarantee control over personal 
information, it also yields an acceptable tradeoff between privacy and 
competing concerns.16  The overall pattern of giving or withholding consent 
appears to define an acceptable line between permissible and impermissible 
uses of personal information. 
The apparent virtues of a consent requirement are an illusion.  We cannot 
rely on a consent requirement to ensure an adequate degree of informational 
privacy.  This is not to deny that the goal should be to ensure an adequate 
degree of free and informed consent.  Informational privacy is, after all, the 
ability to control what information others collect about a person and how they 
use and distribute it.17  It is difficult to see how such control can be achieved 
other than through freely giving or withholding informed consent.  But, it is 
one thing to present information and secure agreement; it is quite another to 
actually obtain free and informed consent.  My claim is that the former does 
not—and indeed in practice cannot—ensure the latter.18  The key to achieving 
free and informed consent lies instead in informational norms. 
Informational norms are social norms that constrain the collection, use, and 
distribution of personal information.19  Informational norms explain why, for 
example, you expect your pharmacist to inquire about the drugs you are taking 
but not about whether you are happy in your marriage.  Norm-governed 
exchanges not only implement acceptable tradeoffs between informational 
privacy and competing goals, they also ensure that consumers give free and 
informed consent to those tradeoffs.  This is the rationale for focusing on 
informational norms, as they are in fact the means by which to make the 
tradeoffs and give free and informed consent to those tradeoffs.20  These claims 
require one qualification: they hold only under ideal conditions.21  The 
qualification does not deprive the claims of interest, as it simply shows that the 
interest is normative, not empirical.  The conditions—called ideal transaction 
conditions—define a normative goal, an ideal we should strive to approximate 
in practice.  Current practice unfortunately fails to adequately approximate this 
ideal.22  Lack of norms is one key reason for this failure.  The rapid advance in 
information processing technology has outstripped the relatively slow 
evolution of social norms in a wide range of important cases.  The obvious 
 
 16. FTC, supra note 13. 
 17. See WESTIN, supra note 5, at 7. 
 18. See infra Part V. 
 19. See Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy as Contextual Integrity, 79 WASH. L. REV. 119, 138 
(2004). 
 20. See infra Part I. 
 21. Richard Warner, Turned On Its Head?: Norms, Freedom, and Acceptable Terms in 
Internet Contracting, 11 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 1, 6 (2008). 
 22. See, e.g., infra Part II (discussing the claim that we fall short of the ideal is the claim that 
there is an imperfection in the market in the context of law and economics). 
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response is to create the necessary norms.  What combination of legal 
regulation, market, and social factors will most effectively do so?  That is the 
critical question, and the question with which I conclude this essay. 
Part I defines the relevant concept of a norm.  It also introduces the first of 
the four assumptions characterizing ideal transaction conditions and argues 
that, given that assumption, norm-governed exchanges are an acceptable 
tradeoff.  The argument assumes that profit-motive driven businesses conform 
to the relevant norms, and the objection is that businesses will violate norms 
when doing so increases profit.  Part II answers that objection by adapting a 
well-known law and economics argument to complete the characterization of 
the ideal transaction conditions and to argue that, under such conditions, the 
profit-maximizing strategy is to conform to applicable informational norms.  
Part III contends that, under ideal transaction conditions, consumers give free 
and informed consent to norm-created tradeoffs.  Part IV offers four examples 
in which technologically enhanced information processing practices are 
unconstrained by appropriate informational norms and, hence, fall short of the 
ideal.  The consequence is a loss of informational privacy.  In the context of 
the law and economics argument developed in Part II, the claim that we fall 
short of the ideal is the claim that there is an imperfection in the market.  In the 
law and economics literature, market imperfections are considered 
imperfections because they cause inefficiency;23 the market imperfections 
illustrated by the four examples, on the other hand, are imperfections because 
they significantly reduce informational privacy.  Part V rejects a consent 
requirement as an adequate solution to such shortfalls.  Part VI argues that our 
goal should be to create the informational norms necessary to adequately 
constrain private sector information processing. 
I.  INFORMATIONAL NORMS 
I begin with a typical example of a norm-governed transaction.  Suppose 
Vicky purchases wine from a retail store.  She makes a number of assumptions 
about what information the store will collect and how it will use and distribute 
the information.  The assumptions include collection, use, and distribution.  
Collection: Vicky assumes that the store will not request information about her 
liver function, record the kind of clothes she is wearing, or record whether she 
is in the store with her spouse or another companion.  Use: She assumes that 
the store will not analyze her patterns of wine buying to predict her sexual 
 
 23. See, e.g., Froomkin, supra note 5, at 1501–03; Pamela Samuelson, Privacy as 
Intellectual Property?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1125, 1127 (2000) (citing PETER P. SWIRE & ROBERT E. 
LITAN, NONE OF YOUR BUSINESS, WORLD DATA FLOWS, ELECTRONIC COMMERCE, AND THE 
EUROPEAN PRIVACY DIRECTIVE 8 (1998)); Peter P. Swire, Efficient Confidentiality for Privacy, 
Security, and Confidential Business Information (Brookings-Wharton Papers on Fin. Servs. Ser., 
2003), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=398340. 
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orientation—even if direct marketing researchers have discovered correlations 
between patterns of wine selection and sexual orientation.24  Distribution: 
When she consults the store about a party she is planning, she assumes that the 
store will not publish the party details on its web site.  In general, Vicky 
assumes the store will only collect, analyze, and distribute information in ways 
she regards as acceptable.  From now on, let us shorten “the collection, use, 
and distribution of personal information” to “the processing of personal 
information.” 
We typically assume acceptable processing of personal information occurs 
in a wide range of settings—including, for example, coffee houses, auto 
mechanics, universities, restaurants, and small grocers.  We do so because we 
assume the businesses conform to relevant informational norms.  This raises 
four questions.  First, what are the relevant informational norms?  Second, why 
is information processing consistent with those norms acceptable?  Third, why 
think businesses will conform to the norms?  Finally, why believe that 
individuals give free and informed consent to the norm-permitted information 
processing?  I consider each question in turn.  An essential preliminary is the 
definition of the relevant notion of a norm. 
A. Norms Defined 
A norm is a sanction-supported behavioral regularity in a group of people, 
where the regularity exists in part because each group member thinks that he or 
she ought, other things being equal, to act in accord with that regularity.25  
Imagine: you are about to enter an elevator in which others are already present.  
Where do you stand?  The norm is to maximize the distance between you and 
the person nearest you.  As a further example, imagine you are making a 
comment during a roundtable discussion; how long should you talk before it is 
someone else’s turn?  You should talk only as long as is appropriate (in a 
contextually determined sense of “appropriate”).  As a final example, picture a 
narrow corridor in which a lawyer with an oversized briefcase encounters a 
parent with a baby in a stroller walking in the other direction; in order for one 
 
 24. Lest this seem too fanciful, consider the direct marketing “discovery in a recent 
presidential campaign that buyers of a particular car-washing product proved enormously 
susceptible to Republican campaign appeals.”  RULE, supra note 3, at 104. 
 25. See Michael Hechter & Karl-Dieter Opp, What Have We Learned About the Emergence 
of Social Norms?, in SOCIAL NORMS 394, 403 (Michael Hechtor & Karl-Dieter Opp eds., 2001) 
(citing Robert Sugden, Normative Expectations: The Simultaneous Evolution of Institutions and 
Norms, in ECONOMICS, VALUES, AND ORGANIZATION 73, 78–79 (Ben-Ner Avner & Louis 
Putterman eds., 1998)).  There are various definitions of norms, and it would be a mistake to 
wonder which one is “correct.”  There are just different concepts serving different theoretical 
purposes.  The text defines the concept of a norm that serves my purposes.  See, for example, 
Warner, supra note 21, at 8, for its use in other contexts. 
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to pass, the other must make room.  The norm is that (in most cases at least) 
the lawyer should make room for the parent. 
The sanctions for violating norms in these examples consist of disapproval 
and its consequences.26  Sanctions typically play a role in explaining 
conformity to the norm.27  More fully, explanations for conformity spread out 
over a continuum.  At one extreme, a person conforms only in order to avoid 
sanctions (e.g., avoid eating meat with a salad fork solely to avoid the 
disapproval of one’s etiquette-obsessed friends).  At the other extreme, fear of 
sanctions plays no role in explaining conformity; rather, a person conforms 
solely because he thinks that conformity realizes a state of affairs regarded as 
good (respect for the opinions of others, for instance, in the roundtable 
discussion example).  In between, conformity results from a mix, in varying 
degrees, of both factors.  The essential point is that, across the entire 
continuum, it is true to say that one thinks he ought to conform.  The “ought” is 
purely prudential at the “conform only to avoid sanctions” end and entirely 
non-prudential at the “conform solely to realize a good state of affairs” end. 
1. Informational Norms 
Informational norms are norms that govern the collection, use, and 
distribution of information.28  As the communications theorist Helen 
Nissenbaum notes, informational norms 
[g]enerally . . . circumscribe the type or nature of information about various 
individuals that, within a given context, is allowable, expected, or even 
demanded to be revealed.  In medical contexts, it is appropriate to share details 
of our physical condition or, more specifically, the patient shares information 
about his or her physical condition with the physician but not vice versa; 
among friends we may pour [sic] over romantic entanglements (our own and 
those of others); to the bank or our creditors, we reveal financial information; 
with our professors, we discuss our own grades; at work, it is appropriate to 
discuss work-related goals and the details and quality of performance.29 
 
 26. I focus on “sanctions” as penalties; norms may also be associated with “sanctions” that 
consist in approval or some other benefit (a “sanction” in the sense of ratifying or approving). 
 27. See Hechter & Opp, supra note 25, at 403–04 (citing A.L. Epstein, Sanctions, in 14 
INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES, at 1 (David L. Sills ed., 1968)). 
 28. See Nissenbaum, supra note 19, at 138. 
 29. Id.  See also Helen Nissenbaum, Protecting Privacy in an Information Age: The Problem 
of Privacy in Public, 17 LAW & PHIL. 559, 581–82 (1998) (“For the myriad transactions, 
situations and relationships in which people engage, there are norms—explicit and implicit—
governing how much information and what type of information is fitting for them.”); James 
Rachels, Why Privacy Is Important, 4 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 323, 328 (1975) (“[T]he sort of 
relationship people have to one another involves a conception of how it is appropriate for them to 
behave with each other, and what is more, a conception of the kind and degree of knowledge 
concerning one another which it is appropriate for them to have.”). 
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As the reference to friends and romantic entanglements illustrates, 
informational norms govern commercial and non-commercial interactions.30  
In the commercial context, informational norms are instances of the following 
pattern: a business may collect, use, and distribute information only as is 
appropriate for that business.31  “Appropriateness” is determined 
contextually.32  Over a wide range of cases, group members share a complex 
set of values that leads them to more or less agree in their particular contextual 
judgments of appropriateness.33 
Consumer and business transactions occur against a background of 
informational norms,34 I will not argue for this assumption.  I rely instead on 
the work of Nissenbaum and others.35  An example of an informational norm is 
in order, however.  Vicky’s wine store visit serves the purpose.36  The relevant 
norm is that the store may process information only in ways appropriately 
related to the store’s role as a seller of wine.  The first point to note is that the 
norm defines a tradeoff between informational privacy and competing 
concerns.  The competing concerns include increased economic efficiency, 
 
 30. See, e.g., Nissenbaum, supra note 19, at 138. 
 31. See, e.g., Adam Barth et al., Privacy and Contextual Integrity: Framework and 
Applications, in 2006 IEEE SYMPOSIUM ON SECURITY AND PRIVACY 184, 186; Nissenbaum, 
supra note 19, at 138. 
 32. See Barth et al., supra note 31, at 186. 
 33. As Michael Zimmer notes, “within each context, the relevant agents, the types of 
information, and transmissions principles combine to shape the governing informational norms.”  
Michael Zimmer, Privacy on Planet Google: Using the Theory of “Contextual Integrity” to 
Clarify the Privacy Threats of Google’s Quest for the Perfect Search Engine, 3 J. OF BUS. & 
TECH. L. 109, 115 (2008) (citing Barth et al., supra note 31, at 186). 
 34. Norms vary from group to group.  For simplicity, however, I take the relevant group to 
be all United States consumers.  Norm variation has been studied in the contractual context.  In 
the case of warranties, for example, higher income consumers may prefer higher prices and 
longer warranties while lower income consumers may prefer lower prices and shorter warranties. 
See William R. Darden & C.P. Rao, A Linear Covariate Model of Warranty Attitudes and 
Behaviors, 16 J. MARKETING RES. 466, 475 (1979). 
 35.  In addition to Nissenbaum, relevant theorists include: PIERRE BOURDIEU & LOÏC J.D. 
WACQUANT, AN INVITATION TO REFLEXIVE SOCIOLOGY (1992); MICHAEL PHILIPS, BETWEEN 
UNIVERSALISM AND SKEPTICISM: ETHICS AS SOCIAL ARTIFACT (1994); MICHAEL WALZER, 
SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY (1983); Julie E. Cohen, 
Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject As Object, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1373 
(2000); Roger Friedland & Robert R. Alford, Bringing Society Back In: Symbols, Practices, and 
Institutional Contradictions, in THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM IN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS 
232 (Walter W. Powell & Paul J. DiMaggio eds., 1991); Jeroen van den Hoven, Privacy and the 
Varieties of Informational Wrongdoing, COMP. & SCI., Sept. 1997, at 33, reprinted in READINGS 
IN CYBERETHICS 430 (Richard A. Spinello & Herman T. Tavani eds., 2001); Robert C. Post, The 
Social Foundations of Privacy: Community and Self in the Common Law Tort, 77 CAL. L. REV. 
957 (1989); Rachels, supra note 29; Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 
52 VAND. L. REV. 1609 (1999). 
 36. See supra pp. 1052–53. 
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improved security, improved inventory control, marketing, business planning, 
and better customer relationships.37  The norm promotes these ends by 
permitting the processing of some personal information; it strikes a balance 
between promoting these ends and promoting informational privacy by 
permitting the processing of only some information and only for certain 
purposes. 
The key question is, why is the wine store norm a norm at all?  Why, that 
is, is it a sanction-supported regularity to which we think we ought to 
conform?  The answer here provides a template for answering the same 
question in more controversial cases later.  The relevant regularity exists: wine 
stores typically process information only in appropriate ways.  They do not, for 
example, request information about liver functions, publish details about 
customer parties on the store web site, or analyze buying patterns to determine 
sexual orientation.  The regularity is also sanction-supported.  The sanction for 
the wine store’s violation is lost business; customers would tend to desert a 
store they discovered engaged in such practices.38  The sanction for consumer 
non-conformity is the inconvenience of always paying cash and the loss of 
store discounts and other advantages that require identifying oneself.39  
Conformity benefits consumers and society as a whole by promoting more 
efficient businesses that better serve consumers’ needs.40  The price we pay for 
these benefits is merely allowing businesses to process personal information 
within norm-imposed constraints—constraints that ensure the processing is 
acceptable.41  In light of these facts, we think (or would after adequate 
reflection think) we are better off if we conform; therefore, we decide that we 
ought to conform. 
 
 37. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
 38. See James. R. Averill, Studies on Anger and Aggression: Implications for Theories of 
Emotion, 38 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1145, 1149 (1983) (noting that violation of norms in an 
exchange provokes anger and may lead to the termination of the exchange); Janice Tsai et al., The 
Effect of Online Privacy Information on Purchasing Behavior: An Experimental Study, INFO. 
SYS. RES., ePub ahead of print Feb. 19, 2010, at 2, 15, http://isr.journal.informs.org/cgi/reprint/ 
isre.1090.0260v1 (“Our results suggest that individuals are willing to pay a premium for privacy 
when privacy information is made prominent and intuitive. . . .  We found that participants 
provided with salient privacy information took that information into consideration, making 
purchases from websites offering medium or high levels of privacy.”). 
 39. See infra note 144 and accompanying text. 
 40. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
 41. See COMM. ON PRIVACY IN THE INFO. AGE, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, ENGAGING 
PRIVACY AND INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY IN A DIGITAL AGE 164 (James Waldo et al. eds., 
2007). 
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2. Value-Justified Norms 
Business information processing practices are inadequately constrained by 
informational norms.  The problem is that the rapid increase in information 
processing has outpaced the evolution of norms, leading to a lack norms in 
many important cases.42  To stop the critique here, however, would be to 
overlook another crucial way in which we lack appropriate norms.  Across a 
wide range of significant cases, informational norms do exist, but they are not 
consistent with our values; they are not value-justified.43  In such cases, we do 
not lack norms per se, but we do lack value-justified norms.  What, then, is a 
value-justified norm?  And, why does it matter whether a norm is value-
justified? 
To answer the first question, consider that we typically conform to norms 
without much thought; when you step into an elevator, for example, you just 
unreflectively stand in the appropriate spot.  You think you ought to stand 
there, but you do not worry or wonder about the justification for that “ought.”  
But you could justify it if you reflected on the norm under ideal conditions 
(including having sufficient time, information, lack of bias, and so on).44  You 
could justify the balance the norm strikes between ‘not feeling crowded’ and 
being able to use the elevator when it arrives.  Roughly speaking, a norm is 
value-justified when one can, in light of one’s values, justify the norm. 
This is “rough speaking” because justification is a matter of degree.  One 
might, for example, regard the elevator norm as justified but also think that the 
following alternative is even more justified: maximize the distance from your 
nearest neighbor and do not enter the elevator unless that distance is at least 
three inches.  It is essential to take degrees of justification into account to 
arrive at an explanation of value-justification that will serve our purposes in 
what follows.  Thus, let us define a value-justified norm: a norm is value-
justified when, in light of the values of all (or almost all) members of the group 
in which the norm obtains, the norm is at least as well justified as any 
alternative.45  It is worth emphasizing the requirement of justification, in light 
of the values of all (or almost all) members of the group in which the norm 
obtains; this plays an important role later in the argument that, under ideal 
 
 42. See, e.g., id. at 215–16 (discussing the informational processing concerns surrounding 
the mapping of the human genome). 
 43. Warner, supra note 21, at 8–9. 
 44. The appeal to reasoning under appropriate conditions to justify normative conclusions 
begins (at least) with Aristotle.  See generally ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS (Martin 
Ostwald trans., Liberal Arts Press, 19th prtg. 1980).  For a modern exposition and defense of this 
approach, see generally STEPHEN L. DARWALL, IMPARTIAL REASON (1983). 
 45. See Warner, supra note 21, at 8–9. 
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transaction conditions, all (or almost all) consumers freely consent to norm-
implemented tradeoffs.46 
My critique of current information processing practices focuses on a 
particular type of failure of value-justification.  The following example 
illustrates the relevant type and serves as a useful reference point in developing 
the critique.  Until the 1970s, the norm among National Hockey League 
players was not to wear a helmet.47  The norm remained despite the clear risk 
of severe head injury48 and the majority vote in a secret ballot where players 
said that the league should require them to wear helmets.49  “One player 
summed up the feelings of many: ‘It’s foolish not to wear a helmet.  But I 
don’t—because the other guys don’t.  I know that’ [sic] silly, but most of the 
players feel the same way.’”50  Thus, most players preferred that most 
players—themselves included—wear a helmet but preferred not to wear a 
helmet if most others did not. The players conformed to the no-helmet norm to 
avoid two sanctions: non-helmet-wearing players’ perception that helmet-
wearers lacked toughness, and a small loss in playing effectiveness against 
non-helmet-wearing players.51  In light of the sanctions, each player thought he 
ought to conform.  The result was that it remained a norm not to wear a helmet 
until 1979, when the League required all players to wear helmets.52  Despite its 
persistence, the “no helmet” norm was not value-justified.  There was an 
alternative the players regarded as far better justified: that all players should 
wear helmets. 
This suffices for an explanation of value-justification.  Now, why does 
value-justification matter?  The hockey helmet example shows why.  The no-
helmet norm defined a tradeoff between the risk of head injury, on the one 
hand, and on the other, retaining peripheral vision and appearing tough.  When 
they conformed to this norm, the players accepted the tradeoff—even though 
they regarded another norm (all players wear helmets) and another tradeoff 
(reduced risk of head injury) as far better justified.  This is why value-
justification matters: conformity to a norm that lacks value-justification means 
acting contrary to one’s values.  This same pattern appears in the lack-of-
value-justification norms examined in Part IV.  We are trapped in conformity 
 
 46. The point is to avoid a “majoritarian bias.”  The view is not that if a majority find a norm 
value-justified, then all who conform do so freely. 
 47. See NATIONAL HOCKEY LEAGUE, THE HISTORY OF HOCKEY EQUIPMENT (2002), 
available at http://stars.nhl.com/ext/pdf/NHL_UniformBooklet.pdf. 
 48. Thomas C. Schelling, Hockey Helmets, Concealed Weapons, and Daylight Saving: A 
Study of Binary Choices with Externalities, 17 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 381, 381 (1973). 
 49. James Surowiecki, Fuel for Thought, NEW YORKER, July 23, 2007, at 25, 25. 
 50. Schelling, supra note 48, at 381 (quoting The Stick that Sickens, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 6, 
1969, at 95, 95). 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
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to those norms even though our values lead us to regard alternative norms as 
far better justified. 
B. Why is Norm-Consistent Information Processing Acceptable? 
Why is information processing that is consistent with relevant 
informational norms acceptable?  Indeed, does not the immediately preceding 
discussion show that this is not always true?  When we are trapped in 
conformity to a norm that lacks value-justification, we are trapped into acting 
contrary to our values.  How can that qualify as acceptable?  My answer is that, 
under ideal transaction conditions, information processing consistent with the 
relevant norms is acceptable to the extent practice approximates the ideal.  The 
first step in defending this claim is to explain the relevant sense of 
“acceptable.”  “Acceptable” in this context means the following: norm-
consistent information processing is acceptable when (and only when) the 
norm is value-justified.  The first of the four assumptions characterizing the 
ideal conditions—the norm completeness assumption—guarantees that norms 
are value-justified. 
The assumption is that value-justified norms govern all personal 
information processing by businesses.  The assumption is approximately true, 
and its approximate truth ensures that the ideal it defines is a viable normative 
guide, not an ideal so unattainable that it is irrelevant.  A rich and varied set of 
value-justified informational norms has arisen through centuries of information 
exchanges between sellers and buyers.  The current problem is that rapid 
technological and economic change has outstripped the relatively slow 
evolution of norms, thereby creating types of transactions that are not governed 
by appropriate norms.53 
I make two simplifying assumptions about norm completeness.  First, 
transactions are either entirely consistent or entirely inconsistent with 
applicable norms.  Consistency may be a matter of degree in practice.  Second, 
in regard to value-justification, the simplifying assumption is that our values 
show either that we ought to act in accord with a given norm or that we ought 
not.  In practice, our values may leave questions undecided—showing neither 
that we ought act in accord with a norm, nor showing that we ought not. 
To summarize: norm completeness guarantees that transactions are 
governed by value-justified informational norms; hence, given the assumption, 
it follows that norm-consistent information processing is acceptable in the 
sense defined.  Some may object that this is just a bit of definitional sleight of 
hand that glosses over an obvious problem.  The apparent problem is that 
people vary greatly in the sensitivity about informational privacy, so it is 
 
 53. See COMM. ON PRIVACY IN THE INFO. AGE, supra note 41, at 215–16. 
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entirely possible, for example, that Vicky54 might prefer that the wine store not 
collect any personal information about her at all—even when the relevant norm 
allows the store to do so.  What is the point of insisting that information 
processing is acceptable in the sense defined if Vicky prefers a different 
treatment?  To see the point, consider that, as a member of the community in 
which the norm obtains, Vicky herself accepts and generally adheres to the 
norm.  Thus, if she were to insist on being an exception to the norm, she would 
be violating her own standards and demanding to be made an exception to a 
norm that she regards as at least as well-justified as any alternative.  One can 
easily imagine Vicky insisting on her preferred treatment.  But this just shows 
that, like all of us, Vicky can be tempted by what she nonetheless thinks she 
should not have. 
II.  WHY WILL BUSINESSES CONFORM TO NORMS? 
Why think businesses will conform to the norms?  Suppose, for example, 
that wine stores could increase profits by surreptitiously using information 
about buying patterns to determine their customers’ sexual orientation.55  
Rational, profit-motive-driven businesses will violate the norm that prohibits 
using information in that way.56  So won’t businesses often violate 
informational norms?  My answer is that, under ideal transaction conditions, 
the profit-maximizing strategy for a business is to conform to applicable 
informational norms.57  I begin with a summary of the argumentof this claim: 
(1) some buyers will notice when a business violates a norm; (2) buyers will 
not buy from a business they perceive as norm-inconsistent; (3) businesses can  
discriminate between buyers who will, and those who will not, detect norm-
inconsistencies; therefore, (4) norm-conformity is the profit-maximizing 
strategy.58  In presenting the argument, I assume that both businesses and 
consumers know all relevant norms, and know what tradeoffs they 
 
 54. See supra pp. 6–7. 
 55. Cf., e.g., RULE, supra note 3, at 104 (discussing a direct marketing “discovery in a recent 
presidential campaign that buyers of a particular car-washing product proved enormously 
susceptible to Republican campaign appeals”). 
 56. See, e.g., Elisabetta Povoledo, Italian Judge Cites Profits as Justifying a Google 
Conviction, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 2010, at B8 (discussing a conviction of Google employees for 
violating Italian privacy laws in order to profit from a video of an autistic boy being bullied). 
 57. The argument is adapted from the influential article by Schwartz and Wilde.  Alan 
Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis of Imperfect Information: A 
Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 630 (1979).  My argument proposes a 
normative ideal: Schwartz and Wilde in contrast make empirical claims.  It also bears emphasis 
that my argument concerns informational norms, not—as with Schwartz and Wilde—terms in 
standard-form contracts.  I focus on terms in Richard Warner, Turned on Its Head?: Norms, 
Freedom, and Acceptable Terms in Internet Contracting, supra note 21. 
 58. Warner, supra note 21, at 14. 
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implement.59  This knowledge completeness assumption eliminates the 
possibility of non-compliance through lack of knowledge of norms.  It is the 
second of the four assumptions characterizing ideal transaction conditions.60  
Practice approximates knowledge completeness; one is likely to know the 
norms governing the types of transactions in which one typically engages.61 
A. Detecting Norm Violations 
It is quite unlikely that norm-inconsistent information processing will 
escape the notice of every buyer.  Awareness of norm-inconsistent information 
processing can come from, inter alia, news reports, magazine articles, books, 
consumer watchdog groups, negative publicity from consumer complaints, and 
litigation.62  This is the third assumption characterizing ideal transaction 
conditions.  Call it the inconsistency-detection assumption.63 
B. Norm-Violation Detectors Versus Norm-Inconsistent Sellers 
Other things being equal, buyers will not buy from sellers they regard as 
norm-inconsistent.64  A norm, after all, is a regularity to which one thinks 
everyone ought to conform; thus, to see a seller as norm-inconsistent is to see 
that seller as treating one as one ought not to be treated.  Other things being 
equal, buyers will not purchase from norm-inconsistent sellers as long as 
 
 59. See EDWIN MANSFIELD & GARY YOHE, MICROECONOMICS: THEORY/APPLICATION, 
290–91 (11th ed. 2004) (describing perfect knowledge as a requirement for perfect economic 
competition). 
 60. The other three assumptions are discussed elsewhere within this article.  See supra Part 
I.B (discussing the norm completeness assumption); infra Part II.A (discussing the inconsistency-
detection assumption); Part II.A (discussing the assumption of a sufficiently norm-competitive 
market). 
 61. It is worth noting that if a consumer knows that practice approximates norm 
completeness, then even when he or she does not know what the relevant norm is, he or she will 
still have reason to think that, whatever it is, it is value-justified. 
 62. See, e.g., Robert A. Hillman, Online Boilerplate: Would Mandatory Website Disclosure 
of E-Standard Terms Backfire, 104 MICH. L. REV. 837, 853 (2006) (discussing the role of 
watchdog groups). 
 63. Warner, supra note 21, at 14.  Compare the “informed minority” assumption in the 
Schwartz and Wilde argument.  Schwartz & Wilde, supra note 57, at 635–39.  See also Alan 
Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Imperfect Information in Markets for Contract Terms: The Examples 
of Warranties and Security Interests, 69 VA. L. REV. 1387, 1417–18 (1983).  For criticism, see R. 
Ted Cruz & Jeffery J. Hinck, Not My Brother’s Keeper: The Inability of an Informed Minority to 
Correct for Imperfect Information, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 635, 656 (1996) (arguing that the 
assumption is empirically false).  The inconsistency-detection assumption is not an empirical 
claim, however, but part of the specification of a normative ideal.  See infra Part IV. 
 64. Warner, supra note 21, at 14. 
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norm-consistent sellers exist.65  The fourth assumption, introduced shortly, 
ensures that such sellers exist. 
C. Sellers’ Inability to Discriminate 
Suppose sellers could reliably differentiate between buyers who will, and 
those who will not, detect a norm-inconsistency; such sellers could then act 
norm-consistently for inconsistency-detectors and violate norms for the rest.  
Such discriminations are, however, extremely difficult to make in mass market 
contexts.66  Imagine walking into a retail store or ordering an item online.  
Nothing reliably signals the seller whether one is a norm-inconsistency 
detector.67 
D. The Profit-Maximizing Strategy 
Assume businesses cannot identify norm-inconsistency detectors; then, 
profit-motive driven sellers will conform to norms because that is the profit-
maximizing strategy—provided the market is sufficiently norm-competitive.  
The existence of a perfectly norm-competitive market is the fourth assumption 
characterizing ideal transaction conditions.  A market is perfectly competitive 
with respect to a certain range of product risk-norms when—and only when—
the following two conditions hold.  First, perfect competition: 1) there is a 
large number of independently acting (non-colluding), perfectly informed 
sellers and consumers; 2) no one of whom can unilaterally control the features 
a product has; 3) sellers sell homogenous products, 4) in a market in which 
competitors may costlessly enter and leave; and 5) in which consumers can 
costlessly switch from one seller to another.68  Second, norm-violation 
detection: there is a range of product-risk norms, and for each norm in that 
range, there are enough norm-violation-detecting buyers that a seller’s gain 
 
 65. For further explanation, see Tsai et al., supra note 38. 
 66. See Schwartz & Wilde, supra note 57, at 663–65 (arguing that sellers cannot 
discriminate between relevant types of buyers in mass market transactions).  Cruz and Hinck 
argue that, in contractual settings, sellers may be able to discriminate between different types of 
buyers.  Cruz & Hinck, supra note 63, at 672–75.  However, only one of their arguments 
explicitly addresses the ability of sellers to differentiate between buyers based on their attitudes 
toward contractual terms, and that argument assumes a sales-person explicitly proposes a 
contractual term, and hence assumes a context in which detection of norm-inconsistency would 
be likely.  Id. at 673. 
 67. You may, of course, reveal yourself as an inconsistency-detector if you explicitly insist 
on norm-consistent treatment, or if you detect and object to norm-inconsistent behavior. 
 68. The condition is just one definition of a perfectly competitive market.  See, e.g., JEFFERY 
L. HARRISON, LAW AND ECONOMICS IN A NUTSHELL 261 (West Nutshell Ser., 4th ed. 2007). 
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from norm-inconsistent behavior is smaller than the loss which results if norm-
violation detectors are able to buy from a substitute, norm-consistent seller.69 
The first condition ensures that norm-inconsistent sellers will (other things 
being equal) lose the business of every norm-violation-detecting buyer—
provided that at least one norm-consistent seller exists.70  This follows from the 
fact that buyers who detect a norm-violation will not buy from that seller—
other things being equal.71  The second condition ensures that there are enough 
norm-consistent sellers.  When both conditions hold, the profit-maximizing 
strategy is to behave norm-consistently towards all buyers.72  Rational, profit-
motivated sellers will conform with that strategy.73 
Since I only propose norm competitiveness as a normative goal, I will put 
to one side the question of the extent to which norm-competitive markets exist 
in practice.74  The issue requires a detailed antitrust analysis.  Failures of norm-
competitiveness may justify legal resolution.  Such analysis lies outside the 
scope of this Article. 
III.  FREE AND INFORMED CONSENT 
Under ideal transaction conditions, rational, profit-driven sellers will 
comply with all relevant informational norms, and those norms will implement 
 
 69. The idea of a norm-competitive market is adapted from Schwartz and Wilde’s definition 
of a term-competitive market.  They propose that there is lack of sufficient term-competition (in 
their terminology, a “monopolistic” market with respect to terms) if “(1) the market is not price 
competitive; and (2) the term at issue appears in arcane legal language and fine or otherwise 
inconspicuous print.”  Schwartz & Wilde, supra note 57, at 661.  The point of (2) is to identify 
those cases in which there is a high cost to consumers of searching for and understanding relevant 
contractual terms; the idea is that in such cases “too few [norm] searchers may exist to generate a 
nonmonopolistic term structure.  Id. 
 70. See HARRISON, supra note 68, at 261. 
 71. The “other things being equal” rider merely concerns trivial exceptions that do not 
matter here (for example, the buyer purchases from a norm-inconsistent seller because the seller 
is a relative). 
 72. See HARRISON, supra note 68, at 261. 
 73. Id. 
 74. There is some evidence that norm-competitiveness does not hold.  Privacy International 
points out that competitive pressures lead to less informational privacy: 
[W]e are witnessing an increased ‘race to the bottom’ in corporate surveillance of 
customers.  Some companies are leading the charge through abusive and invasive 
profiling of their customers’ data.  This trend is seen by even the most privacy friendly 
companies as creating competitive disadvantage to those who do not follow that trend, 
and in some cases [is seen as a reason] to find new and more innovative ways to become 
even more surveillance-intensive. 
PRIVACY INT’L, A RACE TO THE BOTTOM: PRIVACY RANKING OF INTERNET SERVICE 
COMPANIES (2007), available at http://www.privacyinternational.org/article.shtml?cmd[347]=x-
347-553961.  One possible explanation is that there are not enough norm-violation-detecting 
buyers. 
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an acceptable tradeoff between informational privacy and competing 
concerns.75  It does not, however, follow that informational norms thereby 
ensure an adequate degree of informational privacy.  That requires that buyers 
give free and informed consent to the norm-created tradeoff.76  Otherwise, they 
do not have the ability “to determine for themselves when, how, and to what 
extent information about them is communicated to [and used by] others.”77  
The “informed” part of “free and informed” is not problematic—not in ideal 
transaction conditions.  Consent to a norm-created tradeoff is informed, 
provided consumers know what the norm is and what tradeoff it implements.  
The knowledge completeness assumption guarantees that consumers have the 
requisite knowledge.78  It is more problematic to regard consent as free, 
since—even under ideal conditions—consent appears involuntary. 
Consider the wine store example.79  It appears problematic to regard 
Vicky’s consent as free because, as a practical matter, she cannot avoid 
consenting to the norm-imposed tradeoff.  Vicky can, of course, prevent wine 
stores from processing information about her by simply not doing business 
with wine stores that process personal information.  But, since she wishes to 
buy wine, it is often difficult to avoid wine stores.  Further, Vicky is not 
interested in pursuing inconvenient, time-consuming searches and stratagems.  
She already committed to a variety of goals—raising her children, pursuing her 
career, enjoying her friends, and so on; the time she can allot to buying wine is 
relatively small.  Of course, she could simply not buy wine at all, but Vicky 
enjoys wine and is not willing to give it up.  Thus, as a practical matter, not 
doing business with wine stores is not an option.  This is true even when all 
assumptions characterizing the ideal transaction conditions hold. 
So how can Vicky’s consent be free?  Constrained choices are, after all, the 
“example par excellence of unfree choices.”80  When a thief holding a gun to 
your head demands, “Your money or your life!,” the thief violates your 
freedom by compelling your choice.  You have only one meaningful option: 
hand over your money.  Informational-norm-governed transactions hardly rise 
to the level of gun-to-the-head compulsion; nonetheless, they both do, as a 
practical matter, reduce a person’s options to one.  Does not the restriction of 
options entail a lack of free consent? 
 
 75. Warner, supra note 21, at 18. 
 76. See Daniel J. Solove, Privacy and Power: Computer Databases and Metaphors for 
Information Privacy, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1459 (2004). 
 77. WESTIN, supra note 5, at 7 (emphasis added). 
 78. See supra note 59 and accompanying text. 
 79. See supra Part I. 
 80. Warner, supra note 21, at 18. 
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Margaret Radin argues strongly for a “Yes” answer.81  According to Radin, 
free “consent involves a knowing understanding of what one is doing, in a 
context in which it is actually possible for one to do otherwise, and an 
affirmative action in doing something, rather than a merely passive 
acquiescence in accepting something.”82  Grant that non-compliance with a 
norm is not a practical option.  Then, does not compliance violate these 
conditions?  It is not “actually possible for one to do otherwise,” so how does it 
not follow that compliance is “merely passive acquiescence in accepting 
something” and not “an affirmative action in doing something.”83 
It does not follow, because a highly constrained choice can nonetheless be 
a free choice.  Imagine that you long to vacation in the Cayman Islands, but 
you are convinced that you cannot afford to do so.  You then discover an “all 
inclusive” vacation package which offers airfare, hotel, and food for a single 
low price.  You opt for the package.  When you eat the hotel food included in 
the package, you have no practical option to do otherwise; you cannot afford to 
eat any other way.  Your choice is constrained.  But, it was constrained through 
your own voluntarily imposed order to freely realize your vacation goal.  The 
choice was one you regarded as better justified than any alternative.  In the 
thief example, earlier, you did not freely choose a scenario that included being 
robbed by the thief. 
Compare Vicky’s wine store transaction.  Vicky allots only a relatively 
small amount of time to purchasing wine.  She wants to purchase suitable wine 
within that time and return to pursuing her other goals.84  She knows the store 
will process some range of personal information, and she wants an acceptable 
tradeoff between her informational privacy and the various interest served by 
processing the information.  The wine store norm—process personal 
information only in ways appropriately related to the store’s role as a seller of 
wine—offers her a ready-made tradeoff that she knows is acceptable.  It 
follows from knowledge completeness that Vicky knows what tradeoff the 
norm entails.  But, how does it follow that she knows that tradeoff is 
acceptable?  Vicky knows this because: 1) tradeoffs implemented by value-
justified norms are acceptable;85 2) norm completeness guarantees that the 
norm is value-justified;86 and 3) knowledge completeness guarantees that 
 
 81. See Margaret Jane Radin, Humans, Computers, and Binding Commitment, 75 IND. L.J. 
1125, 1125–26 (2000) (equating a lack of options with a lack of consent). 
 82. Id. (emphasis added). 
 83. See id. 
 84. Cf. W. David Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of 
Lawmaking Power, 84 HARV. L. REV. 529, 532 (1971) (attributing the rise of standard-form 
contracts to the scarcity of time in modern life). 
 85. See supra Part I.B. 
 86. See supra Part I.B. 
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Vicky realizes that the norm is value-justified.87  This means that Vicky need 
not spend any time discovering what information the store will process about 
her, nor on negotiating information processing terms should she find the 
store’s intended information processing unacceptable.  It bears emphasis that 
this argument relies on the second premise, that norm completeness guarantees 
all norms are value-justified.  I will return to that point shortly. 
Vicky meets two of Radin’s three requirements for free consent: “[1] a 
knowing understanding of what one is doing [2] in a context in which it is 
actually possible for one to do otherwise, and [3] an affirmative action in doing 
something, rather than a merely passive acquiescence in accepting 
something.”88  Vicky meets the first and third requirements.  She has “a 
knowing understanding of what [she] is doing” since she knows what the 
norm-created tradeoff is and knows that it is acceptable.  In addition, consent 
to the norm-created tradeoff cost-effectively furthers the pursuit of important 
goals, and is thus is not an “affirmative action” that fits into an overall plan 
aimed at effectively realizing ends.89  The only requirement Vicky fails to meet 
is that it should be “actually possible for one to do otherwise.”  It is not 
possible for Vicky to do otherwise—in the sense that she is committed to 
purchasing wine, and any transaction in which she does so will be governed by 
the relevant norm.  But it is precisely a pre-packaged tradeoff Vicky wants; it 
is the convenient, cost-effective way to pursue ends that is important to her.90 
I conclude that consumers give free and informed consent to norm-
implemented tradeoffs—under ideal transaction conditions.  This qualification 
is essential.  Ideal conditions include the norm-completeness assumption, 
which ensures that all norms are value-justified.91  Recall that norms are value-
justified when, in light of the values of all (or almost all) members of the 
group in which the norm obtains, the norm is at least as well justified as any 
alternative.92  In practice, diversity in values among group members will 
typically ensure that groups only approximate this definition.  For simplicity, 
set the problem of diversity of values aside.93  In the case of informational 
norms governing consumer-merchant transactions, assume that there is 
sufficient agreement on values to make the simplification permissible.  The 
point to emphasize here is that it is essential to the argument that the norms are 
value-justified.  This is a key step in the argument that consumers know that 
 
 87. See supra Part II. 
 88. Radin, supra note 81, at 1126. 
 89. Warner, supra note 21, at 20. 
 90. For a similar examination of these norms as applied to standard form contracts, see 
Warner, supra note 21, at 20. 
 91. See supra Part II.B. 
 92. See supra text accompanying note 45. 
 93. Value-diversity cries out for further investigation but is outside the scope of this Article. 
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norm-implemented tradeoffs are acceptable, and hence, that consumers’ 
consent to such tradeoffs qualifies as free.94  The link between value-justified 
norms and free consent free plays a pivotal role in the next section.  The 
section examines four scenarios in which advances in information processing 
technology have had a corrosive effect on informational norms. 
IV.  THE CORROSIVE EFFECT 
I focus exclusively on a single corrosive effect: violations of the norm 
completeness assumption.  I do not mean to suggest that it is unproblematic to 
assume either that the relevant markets are sufficiently norm-competitive or 
that the inconsistency-detection and knowledge-completeness assumptions are 
approximately true.  Norm-completeness especially calls for investigation.  I 
focus on norm completeness because it clearly fails to hold in practice, and the 
failure has important consequences.  There are two ways in which norm 
completeness fails to hold.  The first is a lack of relevant norms altogether; the 
second is a lack of value-justified norms.95  I examine one example of a lack of 
norms and three examples in which the norms exist but are not value-justified.  
The reason for the emphasis on the latter is that I presume that technological 
advances have created novel transactions that are simply not governed by 
conventional norms; whereas, on the other hand, the loss of value-justification 
is less obvious and indeed has so far gone unnoticed. 
A. Lack of Norms 
As a result of technological advances, businesses now process consumers’ 
personal information in novel ways.96  In many cases, the following two 
conditions hold: 1) businesses vary considerably in the degree to which their 
information processing invades informational privacy; and 2) there is no 
agreement on the extent to which they ought to respect informational privacy.97  
It follows that no relevant informational norm exists.  Recall that a norm exists 
only when there is a regularity to which one thinks one ought to conform.98  
The variation in the privacy-invasiveness of information processing means that 
no appropriate regularity exists, and the disagreement over how informational 
privacy ought to be respected shows that there is no regularity to which we 
 
 94. See Warner, supra note 21, at 26. 
 95. Id. at 21. 
 96. See Joseph Phelps et al., Privacy Concerns and Consumer Willingness to Provide 
Personal Information, 19 J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 27, 28 (2000). 
 97. Cf. Diane P. Michelfelder, The Moral Value of Informational Privacy in Cyberspace, 3 
ETHICS & INFO. TECH. 129, 129 (2001) (citing JULIE C. INNESS, PRIVACY, INTIMACY, AND 
ISOLATION 3 (1992)) (noting inconsistent understandings of privacy by academics). 
 98. See supra Part I. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
1068 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 55:1047 
think we ought to conform.99  Google’s “cloud computing”100 services are an 
example. 
Google’s cloud computer services include Gmail (an email service),101 
Google Docs (a document editing, storage, and sharing service),102 Google 
Desktop (an integrated search tool for both a computer’s local hard drive and 
the Internet),103 Picasa Web Albums (a photo storage and sharing service),104 
Google Calendar (a calendar sharing service), 105 and Google Buzz (a social 
networking service).106  Google retains all data generated by users’ activity on 
its servers.107  Users of these services identify themselves when they log in—
an action necessary to use these services—and when they add personal 
information to documents.108  The result is that Google obtains and stores a 
vast amount of personal information.109 
 
 99. See supra Part I. 
 100. In cloud computing, applications and data are stored on servers remotely accessed by 
web browsers.  See Peter Mell & Tim Grance, The NIST Definition of Cloud Computing, NAT’L 
INST. OF STANDARDS (Oct. 7, 2009), http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/SNS/cloud-computing/index. 
html. 
 101. GMAIL, http://mail.google.com (last visited Apr. 10, 2011). 
 102. GOOGLE DOCS, http://www.docs.google.com (last visited Apr. 10, 2011). 
 103. GOOGLE DESKTOP, http://www.desktop.google.com (last visited Apr. 10, 2011). 
 104. PICASA WEB ALBUMS, http://www.picasaweb.google.com (last visted Apr. 10, 2011). 
 105. GOOGLE CALENDAR, http://calendar.google.com (last visted Apr. 10, 2011). 
 106. GOOGLE BUZZ, http://www.google.com/buzz (last visted Apr. 10, 2011). 
 107. Privacy Policy, GOOGLE PRIVACY CTR., http://www.google.com/intl/en/privacy-
policy.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2011). 
 108. Complaint and Request for Injunction, Request for Investigation, and For Other Relief at 
7, In re Google, Inc. & Cloud Computing Servs. (F.T.C. Mar. 17, 2009), available at 
http://epic.org/privacy/cloudcomputing/google/ftc031709.pdf. 
 109. Here is a brief summary of the information Google processed at the time the Complaint 
was filed in In re Google.  Each privacy policy allowed Google to use the information to maintain 
and improve Google services.  Depending on how “maintain and improve” is interpreted, the 
provision could have granted Google a broad license to use the information as it wishes.   On 
October 3, 2010, however, Google amended their general privacy policy to extend to all products, 
services, and websites including Gmail, Google Docs, Google Desktop, Picasa Web Albums, 
Google Calendar, and Google Buzz.  Privacy Policy, supra note 107.  For more information, see 
Zimmer, supra note 33, at 115–18 (summarizing Google’s information processing practices). 
 Gmail: “Google records information such as account activity (including storage usage, 
number of log-ins), data displayed or clicked on (including UI elements, ads, links), and other log 
information (including browser type, IP-address, date and time of access, cookie ID, and referrer 
URL).”  GMAIL PRIVACY NOTICE, Feb. 9, 2010, http://mail.google.com/mail/help/privacy.html 
(on file with ST. LOUIS U. L.J.). 
 Google Docs: “Google records information such as account activity (e.g., storage usage, 
number of log-ins, actions taken), data displayed or clicked on (e.g., UI elements, links), and 
other log information (e.g., browser type, IP address, date and time of access, cookie ID, referrer 
URL).  Content.  Google Docs stores, processes and maintains your files (as well as previous 
versions of your files), sharing lists, and other data related to your account in order to provide the 
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No norm defines what a cloud computing service provider may do with the 
information it processes.  To begin with, there is no regularity; the service 
providers vary significantly in the extent to which their information processing 
invades informational privacy.110  Further, as the sharp controversy over cloud 
computing privacy shows, there is no agreement as to what the regularity ought 
to be.111  Similar remarks could be made about a number of other technology-
 
service to you.”  GOOGLE DOCS PRIVACY POLICY, Oct. 30, 2009, http://www.google.com/google 
-d-s/privacy.html (on file with ST. LOUIS U. L.J.). 
 Google Desktop: “The Google Desktop application indexes and stores versions of your 
files and other computer activity, such as email, chats, and web history.  These versions may also 
be mixed with your Web search results to produce results pages for you that integrate relevant 
content from your computer and information from the Web.  Your computer’s content is not sent 
to Google without your explicit permission.  Your copy of Google Desktop includes a unique 
application number.  This number and information about your installation (e.g., operating system 
type, version number) will be sent to Google when you first install and use it and when Google 
Desktop automatically checks for updates.”  GOOGLE DESKTOP PRIVACY POLICY, Nov. 2008, 
http://desktop.google.com/privacypolicy.html (on file with ST. LOUIS U. L.J.). 
 Picasa Web Albums: “Google’s servers automatically record certain information . . . such 
as account activity (including storage usage and number of log-ins), data displayed or clicked on 
(including UI links); and other log information (including browser type, IP-address, date and time 
of access, cookie ID, and referrer URL).”  PICASA PRIVACY NOTICE, Dec. 02, 2008, 
http://picasa.google.com/privacy.html (on file with ST. LOUIS U. L.J.). 
 Google Calendar: “Usage statistics. We may record information about your usage of 
Google Calendar, such as when and for how long you use the service, the frequency and size of 
data transfers, and the number of events and calendars you create.  Information displayed or 
clicked on in your Google Calendar account (including UI elements, ads, links, and other 
information) is also recorded for the purposes described below.  Every ninety days, if not more 
frequently, we permanently delete usage statistics associated with your use of Google Calendar.  
We retain this information beyond 90 days in aggregate form only.”  GOOGLE CALENDAR 
PRIVACY NOTICE, Oct. 14, 2010, http://www.google.com/intl/en/googlecalendar/privacy_policy. 
html (on file with ST. LOUIS U. L.J.). 
 Google Buzz: “When you use Google Buzz, we may record information about your use of 
the product, such as the posts you like or comment on and the other users with whom you 
communicate . . . .  Your activity on “connected sites” (such as Picasa Web Albums or Twitter) 
may be shared in Google Buzz.”  GOOGLE BUZZ PRIVACY POLICY, May 19, 2010, 
http://www.google.com/buzz/help/intl/en/privacy.html (on file with ST. LOUIS U. L.J.). 
 110. See ROBERT GELLMAN, WORLD PRIVACY FORUM, PRIVACY IN THE CLOUDS: RISKS TO 
PRIVACY AND CONFIDENTIALITY FROM CLOUD COMPUTING 6 (2009), available at 
http://www.worldprivacyforum.org/cloudprivacy.html. 
 111. Id. at 4.  See also Brian Hayes, Cloud Computing, COMM. OF THE ASSOC. OF 
COMPUTING MACHINERY (ACM), July 2008, at 9, 11 (noting that the cloud-computing “issues of 
privacy and confidentiality are equally perplexing”).  In December 2009, the FTC filed a 
comment with the Federal Communications Commission; the comment noted that the “FTC staff 
presently is examining “cloud computing” and its privacy and data security implications for 
consumers.”  See Letter from David C. Vladeck, Office of the Dir. of the Bureau of Consumer 
Prot., FTC, to Marlene H. Dortch, Sec’y, FCC (Dec. 9, 2009), available at  http://fjallfoss.fcc. 
gov/ecfs/document/view?id=7020352132. 
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fostered activities, including those utilizing cookies,112 flash cookies,113 deep 
packet inspection,114 and radio frequency identification tags.115  By using these 
devices, consumers provide personal information.  But, without relevant 
informational norms in place, consumers cannot effectively consent to the 
dissemination of their information to businesses.  To lack free and informed 
consent is to lack informational privacy;116 but, without relevant informational 
norms in place, they lack an effective means to give or withhold free and 
informed consent to the ways in which the businesses will process the 
information, and to lack free and informed consent is to lack informational 
privacy. 
As important as this conclusion is, to stop the analysis here would be to 
overlook another important way in which we lack norms.  In an important 
range of cases, relevant informational norms exist but, as a consequence of 
increased effectiveness in processing information, they are not value-
justified.117  The result is a lack of value-justified norms.  The consequences 
are the same: consumers cannot rely on norms to ensure free and informed 
 
 112. A cookie is a small text file stored on a computer by a web browser when one visits a 
web site.  See HAL ABELSON ET AL., BLOWN TO BITS: YOUR LIFE, LIBERTY, AND HAPPINESS 
AFTER THE DIGITAL EXPLOSION 40 (4th prtg. 2010).  The Internet Engineering Task Force has 
promulgated an international standard for the use of cookies.  Memorandum from David M. 
Kristol & Lou Montulli, Internet Eng’g Task Force on HTTP State Management Mechanism 
(Feb. 2007), available at http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2109.txt.  Uses of cookies that depart from 
this standard can raise privacy concerns.  See, e.g., Lori Eichelberger, The Cookie Controversy, 
Cookiecentral.com, http://www.cookiecentral.com/ccstory (last visited Apr. 11, 2011). 
 113. Flash cookies are essentially cookies that are stored in a different location.  See What Are 
Local Shared Objects?, ADOBE SYS. INC., http://www.adobe.com/products/flashplayer/art 
icles/lso/ (last visited Apr. 11, 2011).  Unlike traditional cookies, many users are unaware of their 
existence and standard spyware removal tools do not delete them; this raises a number of privacy 
issues.  See Ashkan Soltani et al., Flash Cookies and Privacy 1 (Aug. 10, 2009) (unpublished 
Summer Undergraduate Program in Engineering Research at Berkley (SUPERB) study, 
University of California, Berkley), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract 
_id=1446862. 
 114. Deep packet inspection is a technology that allows an ISP to view the content that its 
subscribers send over the Internet.  See Ohm, supra note 2, at 1468.  It has a number of 
reasonable uses but raises serous privacy concerns. 
 115. An RFID tag is a silicon chip that emits a radio signal that identifies the tagged item.  
See ABELSON ET AL., supra note 112, at 25.  RFID tags have number of important uses (for 
example, they have been implanted in cattle in order to track them).  See id.  They do raise a 
number of privacy concerns, however.  See RULE, supra note 3, at 182–83 (describing the use of 
RFID tags to track school children).  See also generally KATHERINE ALBRECHT & LIZ 
MCINTYRE, SPYCHIPS: HOW MAJOR CORPORATIONS AND GOVERNMENT PLAN TO TRACK YOUR 
EVERY MOVE WITH RFID (2005). 
 116. One might object that a consent requirement could ensure free and informed consent in 
the absence of norms.  I argue against this claim.  See infra Part V. 
 117. See supra Part I.A.2. 
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consent to norm-implemented tradeoffs and, hence, cannot rely on such norms 
to ensure an adequate degree of informational privacy. 
An analogy illustrates the connection between increased effectiveness in 
processing information and the loss of value-justification.  Imagine two 
elementary school friends who adhere to the norm, “throw as hard as you can,” 
when they play catch.  One of them moves away and returns later as a 
teenager.  When the reunited friends again play catch, one of them injures the 
other by throwing the ball with great force.  When the injured friend 
complains, the thrower says that she was simply following the norm to throw 
as hard as possible.  Both agree that, in light of their current physical abilities 
and values, the norm is no longer value-justified; they no longer think that 
“throw as hard as you can” is at least as well justified as any other alternative 
(e.g., “throw half as hard as you can”). 
Technological advances have made businesses able to “throw harder.”  
Technology makes businesses far more effective in determining whether an 
individual meets whatever requirements businesses wish to impose.118  The 
consequence is the same as in the friends-playing-catch example: the relevant 
norms are no longer value-justified.  There is, however, one crucial difference.  
The friends would abandon their old norm; in case of business information 
processing, however, the norms are retained.  Thus, like the hockey players, 
consumers find themselves trapped in conformity to norms that are not value-
justified.119  I offer three examples of businesses that use norms which are not 
value-justified: the role of retailers in collecting personal information for the 
purposes of direct marketing; information aggregation services; and the 
information processing practices of the health insurance industry. 
B. Direct Marketing: Retailers as Information Brokers 
Direct marketing sorts buyers into groups according to their willingness to 
purchase certain products and services for the purpose of targeting 
advertising.120  Targeted advertising matches advertising content to recipients 
in ways that maximize the likelihood that recipients will purchase the marketed 
materials.121  Defining direct marketing categories requires processing a great 
deal of personal information about consumers.  Retailers routinely collect 
 
 118. Cf. Finance, BUREAU OF CONSUMER PROT.: BUS. CTR., http://business.ftc.gov/selected-
industries/finance (last visited Apr. 10, 2011) (describing use of technology by banks to avoid 
fraudulent consumers). 
 119. See supra notes 47–52 and accompanying text. 
 120. Carol Scovotti & Lisa Spiller, Abstract, Revisiting the Conceptual Definition of Direct 
Marketing: Perspectives from Scholars and Practitioners, at *3 (2005), available at 
http://www.the-dma.org/dmef/proceedings05/Revisitingthe-Spiller.pdf (“Direct marketing is a 
database-driven process of directly communicating with targeted customers or prospects using 
any medium to obtain a measurable response or transaction via one or multiple channels.”). 
 121. Solove, supra note 76, at 1404. 
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sufficient personal data such that they can also function as information 
brokers.122  Retailers acting as information brokers play a critical role in 
feeding direct marketing the personal information it needs.123  Credit card 
companies are a convenient example.  Dywer v. American Express Co.124 
illustrates their information brokerage practices: 
[American Express] categorize[s] and rank[s] [its] cardholders into six tiers 
based on spending habits and then rent[s] this information to participating 
merchants as part of a targeted joint-marketing and sales program.  For 
example, a cardholder may be characterized as “Rodeo Drive Chic” or “Value 
Oriented.”  In order to characterize its cardholders, [American Express] 
analyze[s] where they shop and how much they spend, and also consider 
behavioral characteristics and spending histories. . . . The merchants using the 
[] service can also target shoppers in categories such as mail-order apparel 
buyers, home-improvement shoppers, electronics shoppers, luxury lodgers, 
card members with children, skiers, frequent business travelers, resort users, 
Asian/European travelers, luxury European car owners, or recent movers.125 
I make two contentions: first, that allowing retailers to function as information 
brokers for the purposes of direct marketing is a norm; and second, that the 
norm is not value-justified.  An essential preliminary to arguing for this claim 
is a fuller description of direct marketing. 
1. Direct Marketing 
The development of direct marketing provides an excellent example of 
how advances in information processing technology can enable businesses to 
“throw harder”—to more effectively determine a specific individual’s 
willingness to purchase.  Direct marketing was not particularly effective and, 
hence, not widely used until the 1970s.126  Prior to that time, direct marketers 
did a poor job of differentiating consumers according to their willingness to 
 
 122. Id. at 1408 (“An increasing number of companies with databases—magazines, credit 
card companies, stores, mail order catalog firms, and even telephone companies—are realizing 
that their databases are becoming one of their most valuable assets and are beginning to sell their 
data.”).  An information broker collects, analyzes, and distributes information to clients.  ANGIE 
A. WELBORN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS22087, INFORMATION BROKERS: FEDERAL AND 
STATE LAWS 2 n.2 (2005) (citations omitted). 
 123. Daniel Solove notes: 
  The effectiveness of targeted marketing depends upon data . . . .  Billions of bytes are 
released each second as we click, charge, and call.  A treasure trove of information 
already lay untapped within existing databases, retail records, mailing lists, and 
government records.  All that marketers had to do was plunder it as efficiently as possible. 
DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION 
AGE 19 (2004). 
 124. 652 N.E.2d 1351 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995). 
 125. Id. at 1353. 
 126. Solove, supra note 76, at 1405–06. 
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buy various products and services.127  This changed in the 1970s, when the 
government began selling census data on magnetic tapes.128  Marketing 
companies used the data to construct databases divided according to, inter alia, 
“age, income level, race, ethnicity, gender, and geographical location.”129  In 
the 1980s, marketers supplemented this data with “psychographic” information 
such as opinions, lifestyles, likes and dislikes, and hobbies.130  The rich data 
set, along with advances in database technology and information processing, 
make direct marketing remarkably effective.131 
  Such is the sophistication of American direct marketing that . . . [o]ne can 
reasonably expect to purchase a listing of five thousand women who are both 
public employees and wear sexy underwear; or business owners who espouse 
far-right political causes; or registered Republicans who are purchasers of 
pornography—or, for that matter, of pornography with S-M themes. . . . [You 
can purchase the] guest list information from a hotel frequented by lesbians . . . 
[and lists of] women who buy wigs; callers to a romance telephone service; 
impotent middle-aged men; gamblers; buyers of hair removal products; male 
buyers of fashion underwear; believers in the feminist political movement, 
anti-gay movement, and prayer in the public schools movement.132 
Direct-mail marketing “yields $10 in sales for every $1 in costs—a ratio 
double that for a television advertisement”133 and accounts for just over half of 
all advertising expenditures.134 
The effectiveness of direct marketing is a boon to businesses.135  
Businesses are not, however, the only beneficiaries of direct marketing.  
 
 127. See id. at 1405 (listing only a 2% success rate for direct marketing). 
 128. Id. at 1406. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Solove, supra note 76, at 1407. 
 132. RULE, supra note 3, at 104. 
 133. Solove, supra note 76, at 1407. 
 134. Direct Marketing Advertising Expenditures Account for 53% of Total Advertising 
Expenditures, DMA’s ‘Power of Direct Marketing’ Report Unveils, DIRECT MKTG. ASS’N (Oct. 
13, 2008), http://www.the-dma.org/cgi/disppressrelease?article=1228. 
 135. It is especially important in the case of new products or services: 
  Once a business has developed a new product or service, it must inform potential 
customers.  The cost of alerting consumers about a new product or opportunity can be a 
major obstacle to the launch of new businesses and prevent innovative products from ever 
reaching the marketplace. . . .  “Target marketing” allows a business to send an offer to a 
customer specifically identified as likely to be interested.  In the absence of information 
that indicates which consumers are likely customers, businesses must choose between 
marketing randomly, contacting everyone in an entire geographic community, or relying 
solely on mass media advertising to reach potential customers. 
Fred H. Cate & Michael E. Staten, The Value of Information Sharing (Nat’l Retail Fed’n 
Protecting Privacy in the New Millennium Ser., July 28, 2000), available at http://www.bbb 
online.org/UnderstandingPrivacy/library/whitepapers/valueofinfosharing.pdf. 
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Consumers benefit from more efficient businesses, access to new products and 
services, and from receiving information relevant to their needs and 
interests.136  The cost is a loss of informational privacy.137  The more one loses 
the ability to control how others process one’s personal information, the more 
one loses informational privacy.138  The information processing activities that 
support direct marketing involve a significant loss of control; indeed, direct 
marketing is a prime example of “mass surveillance”—the use of 
“[s]ystematically harvested personal information . . . to determine what 
treatment to mete out to each individual.”139  This “systematic harvesting” is 
facilitated by the fact that, as noted earlier, “it has become increasingly rare to 
deal with any . . . private-sector organization without generating and relying 
upon a database of personal information.”140 
2. The “Retailers as Information Brokers” Norm 
Despite the loss of control, the norm is that retailers may act as information 
brokers for direct marketing purposes.141  The relevant regularity clearly 
obtains: retailers do act as information brokers.  The regularity is, moreover, 
sanction-supported.  Interacting with businesses typically involves “generating 
and relying upon a database of personal information,”142 and the sanction for 
refusing to generate or rely on such information is typically that one cannot 
interact with the business or must do so on less favorable terms.143  Refusal to 
issue a credit card is, for example, a possible sanction for not agreeing to credit 
card companies’ information brokerage activities, and foregoing discounts and 
other advantages is the cost for refusing to use retailers’ discount cards.144  In 
light of the sanctions, most think they ought to conform to the norm.  One can 
forgo having a particular credit card or using a particular discount card, but 
wholesale avoidance of generating and relying on databases of personal 
information would mean a wholesale avoidance of a wide range of commercial 
 
 136. Privacy, Current Legislation and DMA Action, DIRECT MKTG. ASS’N, http://www.the-
dma.org/cgi/dispissue?article=129 (last visited Sept. 30, 2010). 
 137. MILLS, supra note 7, at 271. 
 138. Id. 
 139. See RULE, supra note 3, at 14 (defining mass surveillance). 
 140. Rule, supra note 4, at 183. 
 141. See id. at 196 (describing how information is shifted from one sphere to another). 
 142. Id. at 183. 
 143. See, e.g., MasterCard Worldwide-Global Privacy Policy, MASTERCARD (June 1, 2010), 
http://www.mastercard.com/us/personal/en/general/global-privacy-notice.html (predicating access 
to some services on consent to information dispersal). 
 144. Id. 
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interactions,145 and for most, that sanction is unacceptable.  As Hal Abelson, 
Ken Ledeen, and Harry Lewis note: 
[W]e give up data about ourselves because we don’t have the time, patience, or 
single-mindedness about privacy that would be required to live our daily lives 
in another way.  In the U.S., the number of credit, debit, and bank cards is in 
the billions.  Every time one is used, an electronic handshake records a few bits 
of information about who is using it, when, where, and for what.  It is now 
virtually unheard of for people to make large purchases of ordinary consumer 
goods with cash.  Personal checks are going the way of cassette tape drives, 
rendered irrelevant by newer technologies.  Even if you could pay cash for 
everything you buy, the tax authorities would have you in their databases 
anyway.146 
Consumers might choose to bear the sanctions temporarily in a general 
consumer revolt; however, unilateral non-conformance by any one consumer 
carries sanctions that make non-conformity a choice each consumer avoids.  
Most, therefore, decide that on prudential grounds they ought to conform (or 
would after adequate reflection, so decide).147 
3. The Norm is Not Value-Justified 
The norm is nonetheless not value-justified.  Consumers conform to the 
“retailers as information brokers” norm in order to avoid the sanctions of non-
conformity, but—I contend—they do not regard the “retailers as information 
brokers” norm as at least as well-justified as any alternative.  Consumers 
instead regard an alternative in which they have more control over their 
personal information as better justified.  This is the most plausible 
interpretation of over twenty years of studies and surveys about consumer 
attitudes toward privacy.148  A typical study found that 89% of consumers had 
either a “high concern” (53.7%) or a “medium concern” (35.5%) about 
“general privacy.”149  Table 1 reproduces the results of that study. 
 
 145. Posner, supra note 6, at 248 (“[A] person would have to be a hermit to be able to 
function in our society without voluntarily disclosing a vast amount of personal information to a 
vast array of public and private demanders.”). 
 146. ABELSON ET AL., supra note 112, at 41–42.  Indeed, it is nearly impossible in practice to 
avoid all data collection.  “Regardless of how cautious and informationally conservative a 
consumer is, they do not have the ability to live a modern life and avoid being systemically 
profiled.  Consumer profiling is currently unavoidable by the majority of consumers.”  Letter 
from Pam Dixon, Exec. Dir., World Policy Forum, to Fed. Trade Comm. 10 (Nov. 6, 2009), 
available at http://www.worldprivacyforum.org/pdf/WPF_Comments_FTC_110609fs.pdf. 
 147. See supra note 68 and accompanying text. 
 148. There is an excellent collection of relevant studies in an online database maintained by 
Alessandro Acquisti.  See Alessandro Acquisti, The Economics of Privacy, http://www.heinz. 
cmu.edu/~acquisti/economics-privacy.htm (last visited Sept. 30, 2010). 
 149. Alessandro Acquisti & Jens Grossklags, Privacy and Rationality in Individual Decision 
Making, IEEE SEC. & PRIVACY, Jan./Feb. 2005, at 26, 28 tbl.1. 
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Table 1150 
 
General 
privacy 
concern 
(%) 
Data 
about 
offline 
identity 
(%) 
Data 
about 
online 
identity 
(%) 
Data 
about 
personal 
profile 
(%) 
Data about 
professional 
profile  
(%) 
Data about 
sexual and 
political 
identity 
(%) 
High 
Concern 53.7 39.6 25.2 0.9 11.9 12.1 
Medium 
Concern 35.5 48.3 41.2 16.8 50.8 25.8 
Low 
Concern 10.7 12.1 33.6 82.3 37.3 62.1 
Of course, finding that consumers are “concerned” does not mean that they 
are concerned about the loss of control over their private information, but why 
else would consumers be concerned?  The concern is surely that others will do 
something unacceptable with the information.151  It would be strange if this 
were not true.  In general, control is an important consideration in determining 
whether to enter into or continue a relationship.152  One may, for example, 
refuse to associate with someone because he or she is too controlling.  In 
commercial relationships, conformity to the “retailers as information brokers” 
norm entails a significant loss of control over personal information; direct 
marketing is, as noted earlier, an example par excellence of mass surveillance.  
Why would one not be seriously concerned about such a loss of control?  As 
the privacy advocates remind us, a significant degree of control is essential to 
“intimacy, friendship, dignity, individuality, human relationships, autonomy, 
freedom, self-development, creativity, independence, imagination, 
counterculture, eccentricity, freedom of thought, democracy, reputation, and 
psychological well-being.”153  Anyone—and that is virtually everyone—who 
values at least some of the items in this list values informational privacy and is, 
therefore, concerned with retaining an appropriate degree of control over 
personal information. 
The conclusion would seem unavoidable that the “retailers as information 
brokers” norm is not value-justified.  It is value-justified only if, in light of 
consumers’ values, it is at least as well justified as any alternative.154  But, it 
seems clear that consumers regard as better justified alternatives that allow 
 
 150. Id. 
 151. Alessandro Acquisti seems to take it for granted that this is the explanation.  See 
Alessandro Acquisti, Privacy and Security of Personal Information: Economic Incentives and 
Technological Solutions, in ECONOMICS OF INFORMATION SECURITY 179, 182 (L. Jean Camp & 
Stephen Lewis eds., Kluwer Int’l Ser. on Advances in Info. Sec., 2004). 
 152. Acquisti & Grossklags, supra note 149, at 27. 
 153. SOLOVE, supra note 7, at 98. 
 154. See Warner, supra note 21, at 8–9. 
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them to retain more control over their personal information.155  There is, 
however, a seemingly serious objection: the studies referred to above actually 
contain conflicting results.  Although a large number of studies show 
consumers are concerned about losing control over personal information, there 
is evidence that individuals value privacy less than they may claim; in fact, 
“many are willing to trade off personal information for small rewards.”156  The 
“retailers as information brokers” norm would seem to be a case in point.  If 
consumers find the loss of control objectionable, why do they conform when 
the cost of non-conformity is mere inconvenience and loss of some minor 
advantages such as discounts? 
This point does not disconfirm the claim that the norm is not value-
justified; it confirms it.  The point is precisely what one should expect if 
consumers are trapped in conformity to a norm that is not value-justified.  The 
hockey players’ “no helmet” norm illustrates the point.157  The hockey players 
did not wear helmets even though their values made “all players wear helmets” 
a far better-justified alternative.  The sanctions were sufficient to ensure 
players did not unilaterally decide to violate the norm.  Similarly, consumers 
conform to the “retailers as information brokers” norm even though their 
values make “consumers have more control” a much better-justified 
alternative.  The sanctions are sufficient to discourage unilateral non-
conformity.158  Like the no-helmet-norm hockey players, consumers are 
trapped in conformity to a norm that is not value-justified. 
As noted earlier, conformity to informational norms counts as free consent 
to norm-implemented tradeoffs only if the norms are value-justified.159  
Sanction-compelled conformity to norms that are not value-justified is 
 
 155. For a sketch of a system that would provide more control, see Daniel J. Weitzner et al., 
Information Accountability, 51 COMM. OF THE ACM, June 2008, at 82, 86.  For discussion and 
criticism, see Robert H. Sloan & Richard Warner, Developing Foundations for Accountability 
Systems: Informational Norms and Context-Sensitive Judgments, in 2010 ANNUAL COMPUTER 
SECURITY APPLICATIONS CONFERENCE, at 21, available at http://www.acsac.org/2010/work 
shop/p21-sloan.pdf. 
 156. Jens Grossklags & Alessandro Acquisti, When 25 Cents Is Too Much: An Experiment on 
Willingness-To-Sell and Willingness-To-Protect Personal Information, available at http://weis 
2007.econinfosec.org/papers/66.pdf.  See also Acquisti & Grossklags, supra note 149, at 26, 31 
(finding consumers to have misconceptions regarding loss of privacy); Beales & Muris, supra 
note 14, at 114 (“Judging by behavior in the marketplace, most consumers have better things to 
do with their time than read privacy notices.”); Luc Wathieu & Allan Friedman, An Empirical 
Approach to Understanding Privacy Valuation 1–3 (Harvard Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 07-
075, 2007), available at  http://www.hbs.edu/research/pdf/07-075.pdf (noting that consumers 
trade privacy for economic gain and proposing a model of the tradeoff). 
 157. See supra notes 47–52 and accompanying text. 
 158. See Acquisti & Grossklags, supra note 149, at 31 (discussing how cost may discourage a 
consumer from adopting a privacy technology). 
 159. See supra Part I.A.2. 
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compelled conformity to an alternative inconsistent with one’s values and 
should not count as free consent to the norm-implemented tradeoff.  It follows 
that consumers do not give free and informed consent to the tradeoff 
implemented by the norm, and hence, they do not have an adequate degree of 
informational privacy. 
C. Information Aggregators 
Information aggregators are businesses that collect and resell personal 
information.160  ChoicePoint, one of the largest, obtains 40,000 new records 
daily for its ever-growing database of more than 19 billion records.161  
ChoicePoint’s clients include government agencies, insurance companies, 
employers doing background checks, direct marketers, and potentially anyone 
with an interest in obtaining information about others.162  I contend that it is a 
norm that information aggregators may process and resell any type of 
information (within legal limits) and that the norm is not value-justified. 
The relevant regularity clearly exists: information aggregators do process 
and resell a wide variety information.  The sanction for non-conformity is the 
same as in the case of the “retailers as information brokers” norm: wholesale 
avoidance of generating and relying on databases of personal information 
would mean a wholesale avoidance of a wide range of commercial 
interactions.163  For most consumers, the considerable inconvenience and loss 
of various advantages and privileges is unacceptable.164  Most, therefore, 
decide on prudential grounds that they ought to conform.165  The norm is 
nonetheless not value-justified.  The argument is again the same as in the case 
of the “retailers as information brokers” norm.  Consumers value privacy in 
ways that lead them to better justify an alternative in which they have greater 
control over information processing practices.166  The lack of value-
justification means that consumers do not give free and informed consent to 
 
 160. Beales & Muris, supra note 14, at 109–10. 
 161. Duane D. Stanford, All our Lives are on File for Sale, ATLANTA J. CONST., Mar. 21, 
2004, at A1. 
 162. For information about ChoicePoint, see ROBERT O’HARROW, JR., NO PLACE TO HIDE 2 
(paperback ed. 2006). 
 163. See supra note 145 and accompanying text. 
 164. ChoicePoint collects information from two sources: public records and private sources, 
and one can attempt to foil ChoicePoint’s processing by not disclosing information to the latter, 
or by providing misrepresentations in what one does disclose.  See O’HARROW, supra note 162, 
at 2.  Public records may arise from mandatory disclosure (recording property transactions, for 
example), or voluntary disclosures under penalty of perjury (as in court proceedings); failure to 
disclose and misrepresentation risk legal and non-legal sanctions. 
 165. See id. at 7 (discussing the American desire to trade freedom for security, in the wake of 
the United States Patriot Act). 
 166. See supra Part IV.B.3. 
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the tradeoff implemented by the norm, and hence, they do not have an 
adequate degree of informational privacy. 
The exact parallels with the “retailers as information brokers” norm do not 
deprive the “information aggregator” norm of interest.  On the contrary, one of 
the hallmarks of contemporary personal-information processing is the flow of 
information from various businesses and other sources to information 
aggregators.167  Unlike collecting information exclusively for purposes of direct 
marketing, the practices of information aggregators ensure that information 
collected on one occasion for one purpose is retained, analyzed, and distributed 
for a variety of purposes to anyone who may lawfully obtain the 
information.168  One critical concern is that bits and pieces of personal 
information, innocuous when taken separately, can be aggregated into a 
permanently available and highly revealing profile.169  Privacy advocates paint 
disturbing pictures of the possible consequences.  Daniel Solove, for example, 
contends: 
We’re heading toward a world where an extensive trail of information 
fragments about us will be forever preserved on the Internet, displayed 
instantly in a Google search.  We will be forced to live with a detailed record 
beginning with childhood that will stay with us for life wherever we go, 
searchable and accessible from anywhere in the world.  This data can often be 
of dubious reliability; it can be false and defamatory; or it can be true but 
deeply humiliating or discrediting.  We may find it increasingly difficult to 
have a fresh start, a second chance, or a clean slate.  We might find it harder to 
engage in self-exploration if every false step and foolish act is chronicled 
forever in a permanent record.  This record will affect our ability to define our 
identities, to obtain jobs, to participate in public life, and more.170 
Solove is merely describing possibilities, but these possibilities highlight a 
fact: data aggregation entails a significant lost control over our personal 
information.171  The connection possibilities and fact is hardly unique to 
personal information.  The possibility of having to make an emergency stop, 
 
 167. O’HARROW, supra note 162, at 2. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Solove, supra note 76, at 1452. 
 170. DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION: GOSSIP, RUMOR, AND PRIVACY ON 
THE INTERNET 17 (2007). 
 171. Privacy advocates are often criticized for merely describing possibilities. The 
possibilities may be illustrated by actual cases, but the essential point is that the same thing might 
happen to us.  See James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus 
Liberty, 113 YALE L.J. 1151, 1154 (2004) (“[T]he typical privacy article rests its case precisely 
on an appeal to its reader’s intuitions and anxieties about the evils of privacy violations.”).  The 
criticism is certainly just.  James Rule laments that privacy advocates too often rely on “gut 
reactions.”  RULE, supra note 3, at 183.  However, merely to make this criticism misses one 
underlying point of the describing the possibilities: they demonstrate the fact of loss of control. 
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for example, highlights the fact that driving a car at 80 miles per hour involves 
a significantly greater chance for loss of control when compared to driving at 
50 miles per hour.  Similarly, the degree and significance of our loss of control 
over our personal information is illustrated by the possible outcomes to which 
it exposes us. 
As important as the loss of control is, it is not the only reason one should 
be concerned about a loss of informational privacy.  As the next example 
illustrates, technologically-enhanced information process can lead to 
objectionable outcomes that do not consist just in a loss of control. 
D. The Health Insurance Industry 
Health insurers make money by collecting more in premiums than they pay 
out in compensation; to do so, they must correlate premiums with risks.172  
This requires processing personal information about morbidity and mortality, 
in order to identify high risk individuals.173  They can then control the ratio of 
compensation to premiums by refusing to insure high-risk applicants, 
discontinuing insuring current high-risk customers, or charging high-risk 
applicants and customers higher premiums.174  Keeping insurance companies 
in business benefits both the companies and the consumers who pay for their 
health care through insurance.175  One cost is a loss of informational privacy.  
Consumers lose control over personal information pertaining to mortality and 
morbidity.  I contend that it is a norm that health insurance companies may 
process any legally obtained personal information relevant to determining risks 
of morbidity and mortality and that the norm is not value-justified. 
Insurance companies do routinely process such health information, and this 
regularity is sanction-supported.176  To illustrate the sanctions, suppose that 
after his wife dies, Jones’ doctor prescribes Prozac for Jones’ temporary 
depression.  Jones’ insurance pays both for the office visit and for the Prozac.  
Five years later, Jones leaves his employment—and his employer-provided 
health insurance—to open his own business.  Fearing that the diagnosis of 
depression and the prescription of Prozac could lead to the denial of insurance 
or higher premiums,177 he omits noting the depression diagnosis and 
corresponding prescription on his application for insurance.  If the insurance 
 
 172. Jeffrey Manns, Note, Insuring Against Terror?, 112 YALE L.J. 2509, 2515 (2002). 
 173. See id. 
 174. Manns, supra note 172, at 2515. 
 175. In addition, it has the benefits typically associated with allowing a business to collect 
information.  See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
 176. See Lawrence Gostin, Health Care Information and the Protection of Personal Privacy: 
Ethical and Legal Considerations, 127 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 683, 685 (1997). 
 177. See How a History of mental Illness Affects Your Life Insurance Rates, INSURE.COM, 
http://www.insure.com/articles/lifeinsurance/mental-illness.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2010). 
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company discovers the omission, sanctions include the denial of coverage and 
liability for fraud.178 
It is highly likely that the company will discover the omission.  The health 
insurance industry’s use of information aggregation services makes it quite 
difficult to conceal medical history.179  The industry uses both general 
information aggregators like ChoicePoint and specialized ones like the Medical 
Information Bureau (MIB).180  MIB is a trade association whose insurance 
company members share information in the form of MIB records.181  MIB 
claims that the “MIB Checking Service is the fastest, most effective way to 
prevent omissions and material misrepresentations on insurance applications.  
It’s the only method available during underwriting to help you immediately 
confirm whether the information applicants provide is accurate and 
complete.”182  Such information aggregators allow health insurance companies 
to effectively detect and sanction those who fail to conform to the regularity of 
allowing the companies to process personal information concerning morbidity 
and mortality. 
In light of the sanctions, most consumers think they ought to conform.  
One may occasionally succeed in concealing information about morbidity and 
mortality, but on the whole, health insurance companies are likely to acquire 
such information despite attempts at concealment, and the likely sanction—
 
 178. See, e.g., ANTHEM, MISSOURI: INDIVIDUAL ENROLLMENT APPLICATION 8 (2011), 
available at http://docs.anthem.com/wellpoint/docs/viewDocument?mcItemNbr=AMO-103C-ER.  
Courts uphold the right to collect the information, either because the information is publicly 
available or because consumers have contractually agreed to the companies’ data collection 
activities. 
 179. Services specifically targeting the health insurance industry include MIB Group, Inc., 
http://www.mib.com (last visited Apr. 10, 2011), which collects, uses, and distributes information 
from health insurance applications, and Milliman IntelliScript, MILLIMAN, http://www.mill 
iman.com/expertise/healthcare/products-tools/intelliscript (last visited Apr. 10, 2011).  Insurers 
can use Milliman IntelliScript to gather prescription information in real time and then review an 
easy-to-read online report.  Id. 
 180. See RENEE MARLIN-BENNETT, KNOWLEDGE POWER: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, 
INFORMATION, AND PRIVACY 194 (2004) (noting that MIB has existed since 1902 but that 
technology has greatly increased its power to process information). 
 181. Actuarial and Statistical Research Group, MIB GROUP, INC., http://www.mib 
solutions.com/risk_analytics (last visited Apr. 11, 2011).  MIB records consist of codes indicating 
medical conditions which affect morbidity or mortality.  JON SHREVE, MILLIMAN PROTECTIVE 
VALUE STUDY: THE IMPACT OF THE MIB CHECKING SERVICE ON HEALTH INSURANCE 
UNDERWRITING (2006), available at http://www.mibsolutions.com/pdf/20060310 20MILLIMAN 
20HEALTH 20PV 20SUMMARY.pdf. 
 182. MIB Checking Service-Issue with Confidence, MIB GROUP, INC, http://www.mib 
solutions.com/health (last visited Apr. 1l, 2011). 
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denial of coverage183—is a disaster in a market economy in which one pays for 
health care through health insurance.  The loss of coverage is thus a risk most 
think they should avoid.  Hence, on the whole, the only reasonable option is to 
conform to the norm by not attempting to conceal information about morbidity 
and mortality.184 
The norm is, however, not value-justified.  As in the previous two 
examples, one reason the norm is not value-justified is that consumers regard 
an alternative in which they have more control over their personal information 
as better justified.  In this case, however, there is an additional reason the norm 
is not value-justified: consumers also regard as better justified an alternative 
that differently distributes health care.  To see why, consider that the 
distribution of health care in the United States is determined, in large part, by 
the distribution of private health insurance.185  The vast majority of those who 
have carefully reflected on the problem without bias or prejudice have 
concluded that the distribution is seriously flawed; many who ought to have 
health care go without.186  Thus, if we—people in general—were to reflect 
adequately on the issue, it is highly likely we would regard an alternative 
distribution as better justified.  The conclusion remains the same as before: 
consumers do not give free and informed consent to the tradeoff implemented 
by the norm, and hence, they do not have an adequate degree of informational 
privacy. 
E. Further Examples 
The foregoing examples are not isolated instances.  One could make the 
similar claims about lack of value-justification in a number of cases, including: 
employer use of information in hiring and retention decisions,187 the extension 
 
 183. See, e.g., ANTHEM, supra note 178, at 8 (“If we issue coverage to you and then discover 
an act, practice, or omission that constitutes fraud or intentional misrepresentation of material 
fact, we may rescind your coverage, even after it has been issued.”). 
 184. One might object that this is not true of someone who, for example, thinks it is always 
morally wrong to lie (even to an insurance company) and who would thus not attempt to conceal 
information through deceit.  That person would conform because he or she thinks lying is wrong.  
But this just shows that the person has two reasons to conform: lying is always wrong; and, there 
is no other reasonable option. 
 185. Laura D. Hermer, Private Health Insurance in the United States: A Proposal for a More 
Functional System, 6 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 1, 2 (2005). 
 186. See ASSISTANT SEC’Y FOR PLANNING & EDUC., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN 
SERVS., OVERVIEW OF THE UNINSURED IN THE UNITED STATES: AN ANALYSIS OF THE 2005 
CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY (2005), available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/health/reports/05/ 
uninsured-cps (displaying demographics of the uninsured). 
 187. Employer use of information aggregators allows employers to acquire a wide range of 
personal information including information applicants or employees attempt to conceal.  The 
sanction for concealment is typically denial of employment and possible legal liability; such 
sanctions are so severe that, for most, the only reasonable option is not to attempt to conceal 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2011] UNDERMINED NORMS 1083 
of credit,188 news reporting,189 and the practice of price discrimination.190  Let 
us continue, however, to focus on the direct marketing, information aggregator, 
and health insurance examples.  In each case, we—like the pre-1979 hockey 
players191—are trapped in conformity to a norm inconsistent with our values.  I 
contend that individuals should respond by seeking to create relevant value-
justified norms.  The task is by no means easy.  To see why, consider one 
critical difference between the examples and the hockey players.  It was easy 
for the hockey players to specify a NHL-mandated helmet requirement as an 
alternative to the no-helmet norm.192  It is far more difficult to specify 
alternatives to the norms in the previous examples.  People want more control 
and a better distribution of health care, but describing how best to achieve that 
requires explaining how to balance a variety of competing concerns, and it is 
by no means clear how to strike the balance.  But doesn’t this overlook an 
obvious and much simpler solution: require consent? 
 
information they employer may regard as relevant.  Privacy advocates warn that information 
aggregators have given employers such an extensive power to peer into the lives of applicants and 
employees that: 
[O]ur society will see a growing number of individuals who are disenfranchised for life.  
Large numbers will not be able to find employment because of negative information . . . 
—whether true or not—from years gone by.  Or they will be relegated to lower-paying 
jobs in the service industries, unable to bring their true abilities into the employment 
marketplace.  We [www.privacyrights.org] have been contacted by many such individuals 
in our ten-year history. 
Beth Givens, Public Records on the Internet: The Privacy Dilemma, PRIVATE RIGHTS 
CLEARINGHOUSE (Apr. 19, 2002), http://www.privacyrights.org/ar/onlinepubrecs.htm. 
 188. James Rule discusses the greatly enhanced ability of creditors to determine whether their 
criteria of credit worthiness are fulfilled.  See RULE, supra note 3, at 102; Charles Duhigg, What 
Does Your Credit-Card Company Know About You?, N.Y. TIMES MAG., May 17, 2009, at 40. 
 189. Technology has both expanded reporters access to information and their ability to report 
it through non-traditional means such as blogs.  The greatly increased depth to which reporters 
can penetrate into people’s lives is highly controversial.  See MILLS, supra note 7, at 287. 
 190. Price discrimination is “[t]he practice of offering identical or similar goods to different 
buyers at different prices when the costs of producing the goods are the same.”  BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 1227 (8th ed. 2004).  It is a long-established practice that has greatly increased in 
frequency as the result of technological advances.  See Andrew Odlyzko, Privacy, Economics, 
and Price Discrimination on the Internet, in ICEC2003: FIFTH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON 
ELECTRONIC COMMERCE 355–66 (N. Sadeh ed., 2003), reprinted in ECONOMICS OF 
INFORMATION SECURITY, supra note 151, at 187.  Price discrimination requires sorting buyers 
into groups according to their willingness to pay, and that requires a significant amount of 
information.  Consequently, sellers structure their interactions so they can collect and use the 
necessary information.  Id. at 355.  Price discrimination and its data collection practices are 
controversial.  See generally Douglas M. Kochelek, Note, Data Mining and Antitrust, 22 HARV. 
J.L. & TECH. 515 (2009). 
 191. See supra notes 47–52 and accompanying text. 
 192. See supra notes 47–52 and accompanying text. 
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V.  A CONSENT REQUIREMENT IS NOT A SOLUTION 
A consent requirement will not ensure an adequate degree of informational 
privacy.  First, individuals simply do not invest the time, attention, and effort 
needed to read the privacy notices.193  Second, even if they did, it would be 
practically impossible to devote enough time to obtain and understand all the 
relevant information.194  Third, even if they could obtain and understand all the 
relevant information, they would, in a wide range of cases, make an 
undesirable tradeoff between informational privacy and competing concerns.195  
I consider each objection in turn. 
A. Consumers Do Not Read Privacy Notices 
It is commonplace to note that consumers typically do not take the time to 
read privacy provisions in contracts or privacy polices.196  “Judging by 
behavior in the marketplace, most consumers have better things to do with 
their time than read privacy notices. . . . [P]rocessing privacy notices is a cost 
that most consumers apparently do not believe is worth incurring.  The 
perceived benefits are simply too low.”197  There is good reason for consumers 
to adopt this attitude.  To begin with, reading and understanding a privacy 
notice requires reading and understanding a considerable amount of 
information, some of which is couched in legalese.198  Imagine, for example: 
George downloads the latest version of Adobe Reader®.  Three accompanying 
documents address Adobe’s rights to use personal information related to the 
Reader’s download and use: the privacy policy (approximately 3 single-space 
pages); the terms of use agreement (21 numbered paragraphs); and the license 
 
 193. See Robert A. Hillman, Online Consumer Standard Form Contracting Practices: A 
Survey and Discussion of Legal Implications, in CONSUMER PROTECTION IN THE AGE OF THE 
‘INFORMATION ECONOMY’ 283, 283 (Jane K. Winn ed., Markets and the Law Ser., 2006). 
 194. Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47 STAN. L. 
REV. 211, 241 (1995). 
 195. Beales & Muris, supra note 14, at 116–17. 
 196. See Kang, supra note 12, at 1248 (“For numerous reasons, such as transaction costs, 
individuals and information collectors do not generally negotiate and conclude express privacy 
contracts before engaging in each and every cyberspace transaction.”).  The failure to read 
privacy policies is hardly surprising given the well-documented fact that consumers do not read 
standard form contracts in general.  See, e.g., Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Commentary, Text Anxiety, 
59 S. CAL. L. REV. 305, 305 (1986) (“[C]onsumers who are faced with the dense text of form 
contracts characteristically respond by refusing to read.”).  See also Hillman, supra note 193, at 
289 (reporting survey results in which 44% of respondents did not read standard form contracts); 
Michael I. Meyerson, The Reunification of Contract Law: The Objective Theory of Consumer 
Form Contracts, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1263, 1269 (1993) (“It is no secret that consumers neither 
read nor understand standard form contracts.”). 
 197. Beales & Muris, supra note 14, at 114. 
 198. Eisenberg, supra note 194, at 241. 
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agreement (5 single-space pages).199  The latter two contain a number of terms 
that require a significant knowledge of contract and intellectual property law to 
fully interpret and understand.200  Reading these documents requires a 
significant amount of time, and reading with full understanding is simply 
beyond the capacity of those without the relevant legal knowledge.  
Simplifying the notices to make reading them faster and easier will not yield 
informed consent.  Notices that attempt to provide enough information for 
consent to be informed tend to be like the financial privacy notices one 
receives from one’s bank—”long, complex, and filled with legal jargon.”201  In 
general, “any notice that provides meaningful information about the actual uses 
of information in the modern economy will necessarily impose costs on 
consumers who must read and process the information.”202 
B. Informed Consent as a Practical Matter is Impossible 
Even if consumers did read and understand privacy notices, they would not 
obtain all the information necessary to give informed consent.  The problem is 
that information collected on one occasion for one purpose is typically 
retained, analyzed, and distributed for a variety of other purposes in 
unpredictable ways.203  The unpredictability of future uses makes informed 
consent a practical impossibility.204  Daniel Solove emphasizes this point: 
An individual may give out bits of information in different contexts, each 
transfer appearing innocuous.  However, the information can be aggregated 
and could prove to be invasive of the private life when combined with other 
information. . . . From the standpoint of each particular information 
transaction, individuals will not have enough facts to make a truly informed 
decision.  The potential future uses of that information are too vast and 
unknown to enable individuals to make the appropriate valuation.205 
C. The Overall Pattern of Free and Informed Consent Would Yield 
Undesirable Tradeoffs 
Suppose consumers could obtain and understand all relevant information.  
The resulting overall pattern of consent would determine a tradeoff between 
 
 199. ADOBE READER, http://get.adobe.com/reader/ (last visited Sept. 29, 2010). 
 200. See, e.g., id.  Such clauses include a dispute resolution process, disclaimers that “Adobe 
may change the Terms from time to time at its sole discretion,” and reserved rights: “You may 
not assign (or grant a sublicense of) your rights to use the Software, grant a security interest in or 
over your rights to use the Software, or otherwise transfer any part of your rights to use the 
Software.”  Id. 
 201. Beales & Muris, supra note 14, at 113. 
 202. Id. at 114. 
 203. Solove, supra note 76, at 1452. 
 204. See id. at 1426–27. 
 205. Id. at 1452. 
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privacy and competing concerns.  Is there any reason to think the tradeoff will 
result in the socially optimal balance between informational privacy and 
competing concerns?  There would be reason to think if: 1) the giving or 
withholding of consent signaled consumers’ preferences with regard to consent 
to sellers; 2) sellers responded to these signals by altering their offerings to 
reflect these values; 3) buyers responded by preferring products and services 
consistent with their preference about consent to those inconsistent; 4) this 
feedback mechanism yielded the socially optimal allocation of information.  
But even if (1) through (3) are true, there is no reason to think (4) is.  To take a 
simple example, consider telephone books.  Telephone books usefully facilitate 
communication—the more so, the more numbers they contain.  Suppose, 
however, while most of us prefer telephone books with most other people’s 
numbers in them, a majority of us also prefer not to have our individual 
numbers listed.  If consent was required before a number could be listed, 
reasonably comprehensive telephone books would not exist, and we would lose 
the aid to communication that most of us prefer.  Similar suboptimal results are 
likely in reality.  “[T]here is often little individual incentive to participate in 
the aggregation of information about people, [yet] an important collective good 
results from the default participation of most people.”206 
VI.  COLLABORATE OR RESIST? 
There are two ways to remedy a situation in which a norm lacks value-
justification: collaborate (retain the norm and change one’s values to make the 
norm value-justified);207 or resist (replace the norm with a value-justified 
one).208  Privacy advocates make a strong case against collaboration.  They 
emphasize that a significant degree of informational privacy is essential to 
“intimacy, friendship, dignity, individuality, human relationships, autonomy, 
freedom, self-development, creativity, independence, imagination, 
counterculture, eccentricity, freedom of thought, democracy, reputation, and 
psychological well-being.”209  For anyone who assumes that a significant 
degree of informational privacy is a necessary means to these ends, resistance 
(creating value-justified norms) is the only reasonable option.  The critical 
question is what combination of these factors will most likely produce the 
necessary value-justified informational norms.  I leave this question 
unanswered.  My goal has been to define the target, not explain how to hit it.  
How to do so is a complex question requiring a detailed examination of how 
best to approximate the four conditions defining ideal transaction conditions. 
 
 206. Kent Walker, The Costs of Privacy, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 87, 95 (2001). 
 207. See supra pp. 1070–72. 
 208. Warner, supra note 21, at 14. 
 209. SOLOVE, supra note 7, at 98. 
